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THE JUDICIAL REFORMS OF 1937
BARRY CUSHMAN*
ABSTRACT
The literature on reform of the federal courts in 1937 understand-
ably focuses on the history and consequences of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s ill-fated proposal to increase the membership of the
Supreme Court. A series of decisions declaring various components
of the New Deal unconstitutional had persuaded Roosevelt and some
of his advisors that the best way out of the impasse was to enlarge the
number of justiceships and to appoint to the new positions jurists
who would be “dependable” supporters of the administration’s pro-
gram. Yet Roosevelt and congressional Democrats also were deeply
troubled by what they perceived as judicial obstruction in the lower
federal courts. The “universal injunction” had yet to emerge, but
friends of the administration nevertheless maintained that injunctive
relief granted by the lower courts was substantially, and in some
cases decisively, frustrating implementation of vital elements of the
New Deal agenda. This Article surveys the uses and perceived effects
of such injunctive relief, and relates the story of efforts by the
political branches to address this challenge through (1) enlargement
of the lower federal judiciary, and (2) reforms to judicial procedure
and/or jurisdiction that would inhibit the power of lower federal
courts to thwart implementation of federal programs. The principal
solution at which the Roosevelt administration arrived required,
among other things, that only three-judge district court panels be
authorized to enjoin the enforcement of federal law. This requirement
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remained for nearly forty years before it was repealed in 1976—
ironically, one might think—just as the universal injunction was
emerging as a phenomenon, and the stakes of a single judge having
power to grant injunctive relief increased accordingly.
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INTRODUCTION
The literature on reform of the federal courts in 1937 understand-
ably focuses on the history and consequences of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s ill-fated proposal to increase the number of seats on
the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen.1 A series of decisions
declaring various components of the New Deal unconstitutional2
persuaded Roosevelt and some of his advisors that the best way out
of the impasse was to enlarge the number of justiceships and to
appoint to the new positions jurists who would be “dependable”
supporters of the administration’s program.3 Yet Roosevelt and
congressional Democrats also were deeply troubled by what they
perceived as judicial obstruction in the lower federal courts. They
were particularly concerned with the issuance of injunctive relief
restraining the execution of New Deal measures, and with the role
that judicial appointments and the reform of judicial procedure
might play in ameliorating such difficulties.
1. See JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); LEONARD BAKER, BACK
TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT 8-9 (1967). See generally William
E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Supreme Court “Packing” Plan, in ESSAYS ON THE
NEW DEAL 69 (Harold F. Hollingsworth & William F. Holmes eds., 1969); MARIAN C.
MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING
CRISIS OF 1937 (2002); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT (2010); ROBERT SHOGAN, BACKLASH: THE KILLING OF THE NEW DEAL (2006); BURT
SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF
DEMOCRACY (2009).
2. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288-89 (1936) (invalidating National
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936)
(invalidating Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (invalidating Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act of
1934); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51 (1935)
(invalidating the Live Poultry Code of the National Industrial Recovery Act); R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934);
Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1935) (invalidating section 9(c) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act).
3. See Barry Cushman, Court-Packing and Compromise, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 14
(2013).
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I. INJUNCTIONS
On February 17, 1937, just twelve days after the President
unveiled his Court-packing plan, Democratic Senator Pat McCarran
of Nevada introduced, and the Senate approved, Senate Resolution
82.4 That Resolution provided:
Whereas the President of the United States has presented to
Congress a message bearing upon the judiciary and judicial
reform, and has made reference to the delays surrounding the
administration of justice and the inequality, uncertainty, and
delay in the disposition of vital questions of constitutionality
arising under our fundamental law; and
Whereas the operations of the Government, including the
collection of its revenues, have been impaired and suspended by
the exercise of jurisdiction over its agencies by the Federal
courts; and
Whereas as a result of the issuance of extraordinary writs by
Federal courts and of judgments rendered in such courts, such
writs and judgments in all amounting to several thousands
within the past 3 years, acts of Congress have been set aside or
nullified or made inoperative: Therefore be it
Resolved, That for the aid and information of the Congress in
the consideration of such conditions with a view to the correction
of such abuses as may exist, [six named federal departments and
fourteen named federal agencies] are each requested to transmit
to the Senate, at the earliest practicable date, the following
information:
(1) A statement of all cases in which injunctions, restrain-
ing orders, or other judgments have been issued, rendered,
or denied by the Supreme Court or inferior Federal courts
since March 4, 1933, enjoining, suspending, or restraining
the enforcement, operation, or execution of any act of
Congress, or any provision thereof, administered by such
department or agency, or by any other agency the functions
of which have heretofore been transferred to such depart-
ment or agency.
4. S. Res. 82, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 1273-74 (1937).
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(2) A brief statement concerning each of such cases,
showing the extent to which, and the manner in which, the
operations of the Government have been affected.5
Over the course of the next five weeks, no fewer than seventeen
departments and agencies submitted such reports.6 These included
reports from the Department of Justice,7 the Department of the
Treasury,8 the Department of the Interior,9 the Department of Agri-
culture,10 the Department of Commerce,11 the Federal Trade Com-
mission,12 the Veterans’ Administration,13 the National Mediation
Board,14 the Federal Power Commission,15 the Federal Communi-
cations Commission,16 the Federal Emergency Administration of
Public Works,17 the Social Security Board,18 the Tennessee Valley
Authority,19 the Railroad Retirement Board,20 the National Labor
Relations Board,21 the Works Progress Administration,22 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.23 The most comprehensive of
5. Id.
6. See INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING ACTS OF CONGRESS, S. DOC. NOS. 75-25, 75-26,
75-27, 75-28, 75-29, 75-30, 75-31, 75-32, 75-33, 75-37, 75-38, 75-39, 75-41, 75-42, 75-43 (1937).
7. S. DOC. NO. 75-42.
8. Id.
9. S. DOC. NO. 75-37.
10. S. DOC. NO. 75-38.
11. S. DOC. NO. 75-39.
12. S. DOC. NO. 75-33.
13. S. DOC. NO. 75-32.
14. S. DOC. NO. 75-41.
15. S. DOC. NO. 75-30.
16. S. DOC. NO. 75-31.
17. S. DOC. NO. 75-27.
18. S. DOC. NO. 75-28.
19. S. DOC. NO. 75-44.
20. S. DOC. NO. 75-26.
21. S. DOC. NO. 75-29.
22. S. DOC. NO. 75-25.
23. S. DOC. NO. 75-43. The Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission submitted
a letter explaining that “the laws under which the Commission operates were passed upon
and held to be constitutional” before March 4, 1933, and because the Resolution inquired only
about cases in which the execution of acts of Congress, as opposed to orders of the Com-
mission, had been enjoined, the Commission had “no cases of the kind referred to in the
resolution to report.” 81 CONG. REC. 1464 (1937). It appears that the Secretary of Labor also
submitted such a letter, though the Congressional Record does not disclose its content, 81
CONG. REC. 1662 (1937), and it does not appear to have survived as a Senate document.
Attorney General Cummings’s letter of transmittal for the reports of the Departments of
Justice and of the Treasury explained that all of the information that would have been
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these reports was that of Attorney General Homer Cummings,
which reported on all such cases in which his Department had been
involved, and also contained the report of the Department of the
Treasury, which bore responsibility for the collection of taxes by
which much of the New Deal was enforced or financed.24 But the
reports of several other departments and agencies also shed
considerable light on the nature and effects of litigation in which
neither Justice nor Treasury was involved.25 In the aggregate, these
reports demonstrate that even in a world without universal in-
junctions,26 intervention by lower federal courts could substantially
frustrate the implementation of regional and even national pro-
grams for relief, recovery, and reform.
Consider first the Roosevelt administration’s program for
industrial recovery. The centerpiece of that initiative was the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Codes of Fair
Competition (the Codes) promulgated thereunder.27 One hundred
sixty-two suits were brought against government officials to enjoin
various provisions of the NIRA or the Codes.28 This resulted in the
granting of four permanent injunctions, eleven temporary injunc-
tions, and twenty-seven temporary restraining orders (TROs)
against the government.29 In many of these cases, the district court
did not rule on the constitutionality of the NIRA or Code provision,
but instead rested its decision on equitable principles, such as
“whether [the] plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable injury, or
reported by the National Bituminous Coal Commission was contained in the report of the
Justice Department, and therefore that Commission would not be submitting a separate
report. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at iii.
24. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at iii.
25. See, e.g., DEP’T OF AGRIC., S. DOC. NO. 75-38, at 2 (“There will be found many cases,
listed below, involving rulings in injunction proceedings adverse to the Government respecting
the regulation of such intrastate transactions.”).
26. By “universal injunction” I mean an injunction that is binding on the enjoined party
throughout the nation, and is not confined in its scope to particular plaintiffs or particular
judicial districts or circuits. Such injunctions, which have become increasingly common in
recent years, also have been referred to as “national” or “nationwide” injunctions. See Mila
Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 (2020). For the
sake of convenience, and at the suggestion of the editors, I have adopted the term “universal”
without intending to take any position on this difference of opinion over terminology.
27. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A. L. A.
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
28. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 58.
29. Id.
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whether the Government officer sued was authorized to enforce the
law against the plaintiff.”30 In addition, the government successfully
brought actions seeking injunctions or criminal penalties in forty-
three judicial districts.31 The NIRA was held unconstitutional in
eighteen of those districts, and Cummings noted that such decisions
“served as effectively to restrain further prosecution in [such a]
district as the granting of an injunction against the Federal
prosecuting officers.”32 Cummings explained that it was “impossible
to state definitely how each individual case separately affected the
operation of the Government in enforcing” the NIRA, but he
recognized that “[e]ach decision necessarily had an important effect
upon compliance with the act in the district in which it was handed
down.”33
The NIRA was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States on May 27, 1935,
but enforcement of the NIRA had become problematic well before
that decision.34 Cummings reported that “[a]fter a number of lower
courts had held the act unconstitutional, and when it became
apparent that for this, and possibly other reasons, ... enforcement of
the act was unlikely, violations became widespread.”35 It was
“common knowledge” that “during the last few months before the
Schechter decision, the purpose of the act was nullified to a
considerable extent by the inability of the Government to enforce
it.”36 This may have been due “as much to the decisions denying the
constitutionality of the act as to the fact that injunctions were
granted restraining its enforcement.”37
The report of the Department of the Interior detailed the
litigation concerning the Petroleum Code of the NIRA.38 Section 9(c)
of the NIRA authorized the President to prohibit the interstate
shipment of so-called “hot oil”—oil produced in excess of the amount
30. Id. at 58-59.
31. Id. at 59.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
35. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 59.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. S. DOC. NO. 75-37, at 2-5.
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permitted by the law of the state of production.39 The President
issued such a prohibition by executive order, and also delegated
authority to promulgate appropriate rules and regulations to the
Secretary of the Interior.40 By a separate executive order, the Pres-
ident approved a Code of Fair Competition for the oil industry.41
A petition filed in the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia
sought a temporary injunction against enforcement of the Code on
the ground that the NIRA was unconstitutional.42 That relief was
denied on August 15, 1933, after which the plaintiffs dropped the
suit.43 Another injunction was sought by another party before the
same court on the same grounds later that year, and the injunction
again was denied.44 The following year the federal district court for
the Eastern District of Texas, the location from which the vast
majority of “hot oil” emerged, ruled in a series of cases alleging the
unconstitutionality of the government’s oil program.45 In two cases,
the court held that certain regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Interior under the authority of section 9(c), as well as the Presi-
dent’s order, “were not constitutionally supportable, since they were,
in effect, an attempt by the Federal Government to regulate
production within the State of Texas.”46 As the Secretary explained,
the court “based its decision upon the theory that the production
and refining of oil constituted intrastate business.”47 In those
actions, according to the Secretary’s report, the court enjoined
officials of the Department of the Interior “from requiring reports
from refiners and producers” and “further forbade their going on
property of any producer to discover whether he was in fact overpro-
ducing.”48
39. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by
Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
40. 2 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 281-82 (1938).
41. Id. at 337; see Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405-12 (1935).
42. S. DOC. NO. 75-37, at 2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added). On its face, the Secretary’s report appears to indicate that the
injunctive relief ran in favor not merely of the named plaintiffs, but in favor of all refiners and
producers—at least those within the Eastern District of Texas. For reasons to doubt that the
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Nine days later, in seven consolidated cases in equity, the same
federal judge issued a permanent injunction restraining named
federal defendants from requiring of the complainants the reports
required by the Secretary of the Interior; from instituting any civil
or criminal actions against the complainants for alleged violations
of the Petroleum Code and regulations; and from going upon the
property of the complainants under the authority conferred upon
them by the Petroleum Code or by the regulations of the Secretary
of the Interior.49 The next month, in March 1934, the same judge
held in those same seven consolidated cases that a regulation issued
by the Secretary of the Interior and certain provisions of the
Petroleum Code were not authorized by the NIRA, and that the
defendants, in seeking to enforce those measures, “were acting
without authority of law and that their acts in so doing deprived the
complainants of their property without due process of law.”50
That May, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court on each of
these points, and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the
bill.51 But in January 1935, the Supreme Court held in the same
consolidated cases that section 9(c) violated the nondelegation
doctrine, and directed the district court to grant permanent in-
junctions restraining the defendant federal officials from enforcing
the Petroleum Code.52 The Acting Secretary reported that “[t]he
effect of the decisions of both the inferior Federal court and the
United States Supreme Court in the consolidated cases ... was
completely to relieve the restraint on other oil producers and
shippers, and to encourage a flood of violations of the regulations of
the Secretary of the Interior.”53
In the wake of the Schechter decision, Congress enacted the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 (Coal Conservation
Act).54 One portion of this Act authorized a National Bituminous
injunction was understood this broadly at the time, see Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 433-34 n.87 (2017).
49. S. DOC. NO. 75-37, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1935); S. DOC. NO. 75-37, at 4.
53. S. DOC. NO. 75-37, at 5.
54. See Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991, invalidated by
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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Coal Commission to regulate the price at which bituminous coal was
sold in interstate commerce.55 Another portion recognized the rights
of employees of coal producers to organize and bargain collectively,
and created a labor board to adjudicate labor disputes in the coal
industry.56 As had been the case with the NIRA, enforcement of the
Coal Conservation Act again was impeded by the judiciary. Before
the Supreme Court declared the Coal Conservation Act unconstitu-
tional in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. on May 18, 1936,57 130 suits had
been brought seeking to restrain the government from enforcing the
Act.58 In 121 of these suits, temporary injunctions were issued.59
Only four judicial districts declined to issue injunctions pending the
resolution of the Carter litigation.60 This “made it impossible to
enforce the act, and no effort was made to enforce it even against
companies which had not brought suit.”61 As Cummings summa-
rized the matter, “For all practical purposes it can be said that the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act never became effective during
the 9 months before the Supreme Court decision in ... Carter.”62
Consider now the centerpiece of the administration’s program for
recovery in the agricultural sector—the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933 (AAA).63 The AAA’s objective was to raise the market prices
of agricultural commodities by reducing their supply.64 The AAA
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into contracts with
individual farmers, under which the farmer would agree to reduce
his output of specified commodities in exchange for a benefit
payment.65 These benefit payments were financed by a special excise
tax imposed upon the processors of agricultural commodities.66 The
tax was designed to produce the amount of revenue necessary to
55. Id. at 997-98.
56. Id. at 1001.
57. 298 U.S. 238, 316-17 (1936).
58. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 38.
59. Id. at 99.
60. Id. at 38.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 38-39.
63. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), invalidated by United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
64. Id. § 2.
65. Id. § 8(1).
66. Id. § 9(a).
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underwrite the benefit payments that had been contracted for, and
the statute appropriated the proceeds of the tax for that purpose.67
Over the course of the AAA’s brief life, 1898 suits were filed in
sixty-nine federal district courts to enjoin collection of the process-
ing taxes imposed by the AAA.68 Of those cases, the courts granted
injunctions or restraining orders in 1600 (84 percent), denied relief
in 166 (9 percent), and withheld decisions in the remaining 132 (7
percent).69 All of these injunctions were issued before the Supreme
Court invalidated the processing tax on January 6, 1936.70 In the
district courts, where these suits were filed, only six denied relief,
while the other sixty-three granted relief.71 Even in those cases
where relief was denied, every circuit court other than the Fifth
Circuit stayed collection of the tax pending appeal.72 Though fewer
than 1766 processors were granted injunctive relief or a stay pend-
ing appeal, the amount of tax not collected as a result was approxi-
mately $320 million.73 By contrast, the amount of tax collected from
the approximately 73,000 processors who did not file suit was over
$852 million.74 In other words, relief granted to fewer than 2.4
percent of the nearly 75,000 processors upon whom the tax was im-
posed prevented the collection of 27 percent of the total revenue of
approximately $1.172 trillion due under the tax.
Shortly after the Court invalidated the AAA’s processing tax,
Congress repealed the processing tax imposed by the AAA’s
companion measure, the Bankhead Cotton Control Act (Cotton
Control Act).75 Two suits for injunctive relief already had severely
complicated the effective enforcement of the Cotton Control Act.
Talmadge v. Page was an action in the district court for the Middle
District of Georgia, in which approximately 2200 cotton producers
sought and were granted a temporary injunction preventing
collection of the tax.76 Cummings reported that this “paralyzed the
67. Id. §§ 9(a), 12(b).
68. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 1 (1937).
69. Id.
70. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936); S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 4-36.
71. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 1-36.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Bankhead Cotton Control Act, ch. 157, 48 Stat. 598 (1934).
76. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 37.
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Government’s efforts to enforce the Bankhead Act in Georgia.”77
Meanwhile, a small group of cotton ginners secured a temporary
injunction from the district court for the Eastern District of Texas
in Wallace v. Thomas.78 Cummings reported that because of certain
features of the program’s design, “[t]he effect of this injunction was
to tie up the entire cotton crop of the State of Texas.”79 Though a
compromise between the government and counsel for the plaintiffs
later settled this dispute, that compromise was secured in the
shadow of injunctive relief with far-reaching consequences.80
Cummings indicated that injunctions issued by just two federal
district courts had effectively frustrated the implementation of the
government’s program in two of the nation’s largest cotton-produc-
ing states.81
The report of the Secretary of Agriculture detailed the difficulties
injunctive relief had created in the administration of the AAA’s
provisions regulating the marketing of agricultural commodities. As
originally enacted, section 8(3) of the AAA provided for the regula-
tion through regional licenses of the handling of agricultural
commodities “in the current of interstate and foreign commerce.”82
Those licenses also provided for the regulation of “intrastate
transactions ... declared by the licenses to be inextricably intermin-
gled” with interstate transactions.83 Many courts issued injunctions
against attempts to regulate intrastate transactions.84 The problem
was particularly acute with respect to the regulation of milk.
Federal courts enjoined enforcement of milk licenses in Chicago,
Boston, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Des Moines, Indianapolis, Okla-
homa City, Tulsa, Providence, and Southern Illinois.85 In each of
77. Id.
78. Id. at 37-38.
79. Id. at 38.
80. Id.
81. See id. Cummings also reported that in two cases, one from North Carolina and the
other from South Carolina, injunctions had been granted against the enforcement of the
Tobacco Inspection Act. Id. at 88. These cases, he lamented, had “prevented the act from going
into operation in several communities.” Id.
82. S. DOC. 75-38, at 1-2 (quoting Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, § 8(3), 48 Stat. 31
(1933)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 2-4.
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these cases, the Secretary reported that the decision “was com-
pletely to break down the operation of the license, ... to render
impossible the enforcement generally, of the license,”86 “to put an
end the administration of the license, and ... to cripple the adminis-
tration of these licenses and to cause cancellation or suspension
thereof.”87 The report hastened to add that “[t]he succession of
injunctions granted against the enforcement of milk licenses ... had
the effect also of rendering unenforceable milk licenses issued in
areas other than those mentioned.”88
Another key objective of the Roosevelt administration was to
increase competition and improve services in the public utility
sector. In 1935, as part of this effort, Congress enacted the Public
Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA).89 The PUHCA was a
response to longstanding complaints of a variety of abuses in the
public utility industry.90 The PUHCA required public utility holding
companies to register with and provide certain information to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).91 Registered companies
were in turn subjected to extensive regulation,92 and holding com-
panies failing to file a registration statement with the SEC were
forbidden to engage in a variety of interstate transactions.93 At the
time of Cummings’s report, forty-four suits had been brought in
federal district courts to prevent the PUHCA’s enforcement.94
Because the government developed a civil suit to test the PUHCA’s
constitutionality, and because “it was apparent that the ... suits
brought by the holding companies constituted an attempt to harass
the Government with a needless multiplicity of suits, no effort was
made to defend the suits outside the District of Columbia on their
merits.”95 As a result, injunctions were issued in twenty-eight of the
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 5.
89. See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, § 1, 49 Stat. 803, 803-04.
90. See COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, THE PUBLIC UTILITIES HOLDING
COMPANY ACT OF 1996, S. REP. NO. 104-365, at 1-2.
91. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 §§ 2(a)(6), 5.
92. See id. §§ 6-29.
93. Id. § 4(a).
94. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING ACTS OF CONGRESS, S. DOC. NO.
75-43, at 6 (1937); S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 81.
95. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 81-82; see also S. DOC. NO. 75-43, at 6 (reviewing the govern-
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suits.96 The remaining suits were held in abeyance by the courts or
by the parties pending the Supreme Court’s decision in the civil test
case.97 “The attitude of the holding companies in adopting a plan of
mass refusal to register and bringing suits for injunctions in many
courts to forbid enforcement of provisions of the act,” Cummings
reported, had “seriously embarrassed its administration.”98 Both the
Attorney General and the SEC had “announced that there would be
no attempt to enforce the act until its validity had been established
by the Supreme Court.”99 But had the government not taken that
position, it was “certain that virtually every major holding company
would have seized the opportunity to tie the Government’s hands by
obtaining injunctions in the Federal courts.”100
The Roosevelt administration also supported the construction of
municipally owned utilities financed by grants and loans made by
the Public Works Administration (PWA).101 Cummings reported that
some form of injunctive relief had been granted in sixty-seven
pending suits filed by private utility companies against the federal
emergency administrator and other officials of the PWA.102 These
injunctions sought to prevent the PWA from making loans or grants
“to municipalities and other public bodies for the purpose of
constructing competing publicly-owned and operated electricity
generating and distribution systems.”103 In addition, preliminary
injunctions were issued against the Works Progress Administration
in two cases: one involving the construction of dams on the Colorado
ment’s approach to the forty-four suits brought by the holding companies).
96. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 82.
97. S. DOC. NO. 75-43, at 6; S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 82.
98. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 82. But see S. DOC. NO. 75-43, at 7 (“The effect of this multiplicity
of litigation upon the administration of the Holding Company Act is difficult to determine.
The Government’s course had been decided when it first became apparent that there was to
be a mass defiance of the law on the part of almost all holding companies.”).
99. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 82; see also S. DOC. NO. 75-43, at 7 (explaining the government’s
course of action regarding the multiplicity of litigation).
100. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 82; see also S. DOC. NO. 75-43, at 7 (noting the actions taken by
the government in order to protect itself).
101. See William M. Emmons III, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Electric Utilities, and the Power
of Competition, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 880, 882-83, 885-86 (1993).
102. See S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 63-81; see also FED. EMERGENCY ADMIN. OF PUB. WORKS,
INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING ACTS OF CONGRESS, S. DOC. NO. 75-27, at 5-27 (1937); FED.
EMERGENCY ADMIN. OF PUB. WORKS, PUBLIC WORKS ADMINISTRATION ALLOTMENTS FOR GAS
AND ELECTRIC PROJECTS, S. DOC. NO. 74-184, at 2 (1936).
103. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 63.
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and Brazos Rivers, and the other the construction of an electric
generating station and transmission system (the Santee-Cooper
Project) in South Carolina.104 “The effect of the restraining orders
and injunctions issued in these cases,” Cummings complained, was
“to delay or impede the construction of the particular projects
concerned and, consequentially, to deter the ... basic purpose of” the
Public Works title of the NIRA, “which was enacted to increase
employment quickly.”105 Moreover, as the General Counsel of the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reported, in some of these cases
the municipalities involved had “applied for, or contracted with, the
[TVA] for the purchase of power and have held elections authorizing
the necessary bond issues.”106 Because PWA loans and grants “may
have the indirect effect of providing an outlet for the [TVA]’s surplus
power,” such injunctions “may therefore directly delay the disposi-
tion of the [TVA]’s power.”107
The TVA’s report calculated the damages resulting from five cases
in which injunctive relief had been granted against the TVA and/or
PWA loans or grants for power projects in which the TVA was
involved.108 In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the
plaintiff secured a decree invalidating a contract between the TVA
and the Alabama Power Company for the sale of electricity,
transmission lines, substations, and auxiliary properties.109 The
district court further enjoined various municipalities from making
or performing any contracts with the TVA for the purchase of elec-
tric power, and from accepting or expending any funds received from
the TVA or the PWA for the purpose of constructing a public
distribution system to distribute power supplied by the TVA.110 The
TVA estimated that its lost revenue from power sales was $255,000,
104. WORKS PROGRESS ADMIN., INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING ACTS OF CONGRESS, S.
DOC. NO. 75-25, at 2-3.
105. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 63; see also id. at 95 (“The effect of these cases upon the Treasury
has been to tie up indefinitely the disbursement of funds” that are “to be used in the con-
struction of municipally owned electric light and power plants and water works”).
106. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING ACTS OF CONGRESS, S. DOC.
NO. 75-44, at 1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1-4, 1 n.1.
109. Id. at 1 n.1.
110. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 9 F. Supp. 965, 967 (N.D. Ala. 1935), rev’d, 78
F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1935), aff ’d, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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that its legal expenses were $100,000, and that the loss to consum-
ers was $315,000.111 In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, the plaintiff
secured an order enjoining PWA officials from making loans or
grants to four cities in northern Alabama for the construction of
municipal electrical distribution systems.112 The TVA estimated that
its resulting lost revenue was $188,000, and that the loss to
consumers was $217,000.113 In Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power
Co. v. Ickes, the plaintiff secured an order enjoining PWA officials
from making loans or grants “to the city of Paris[, Tennessee,] for
the purpose of constructing or financing a municipal power plant.”114
The TVA estimated that its resulting lost revenue was $18,000, and
that the loss to consumers was $84,000.115 In Tennessee Public
Service Co. v. Ickes, the court enjoined the PWA from making any
loan or grant to the city of Knoxville for the construction of a
municipal power system.116 The TVA estimated that its resulting
lost revenue was $370,000, and that the loss to consumers was
$545,000.117
The most costly and consequential injunction was the one issued
in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority.118
There, nineteen power companies, “including all the major utilities
within transmission distance of any present or proposed dam of the
[TVA],” sought to enjoin the TVA from executing the Tennessee
Valley Authority Act and the “power program” authorized by the
Act.119 After a hearing, District Judge John J. Gore enjoined the
defendants “from making any new contracts for the sale of electric-
ity or providing any additional facilities for electric service in the
claimed service area of the complainants or any of them.”120 This
“sweeping ... decree broadly delay[ed] the [TVA]’s entire operations,
the negotiating of contracts, the provision of additional facilities, as
111. S. DOC. NO. 75-44, at 5-6.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at 2-3.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 6-7.
118. See id. at 5-8.
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 3-4.
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well as the performance of existing contracts.”121 “It [was] only fair
to say that the decree, unless reversed, [would] delay, for at least 6
½ months, the ultimate disposition of all the [TVA]’s available
surplus power, amounting to more than 200,000 kilowatts.”122
The TVA estimated its lost revenue resulting from the Tennessee
Power decree at $1.5 million and its direct legal expenses at
$50,000.123 The TVA considered its projected loss to consumers of
“25 to 30 percent of the present charges ... a very conservative
estimate.”124 The report also observed that the decree would require
the TVA to discharge 650 employees whose services no longer would
be needed, representing a payroll of $1 million.125 It estimated “[t]he
cost of hiring and training new employees at a later date” to be
about $150,000.126 In addition, all of “the work and expense in
preparation for advertising for materials needed in construction
projects” that had been enjoined would be “wasted.”127 The decree
also prohibited the provision of additional facilities for existing
customers.128 This meant that the TVA could not supply any in-
creased requirements of those customers, and that “existing service
would be jeopardized by overtaxing existing facilities.”129 Finally,
the injunction retarded the TVA’s effort to provide electrical service
to rural customers, by enjoining the construction of over 1000 miles
of rural lines, thereby preventing “service to more than 4,450 rural
residents who have never been served by anyone before.”130
More generally, the report remarked that “no dollars-and-cents
estimate can accurately portray the loss in the waste of the public
resources caused by the inability of the [TVA] to dispose of its
available water power.”131 The objective of the Tennessee Valley
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 7-8.
124. Id. at 8.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 7-8.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id. In two additional cases, Ruble v. Tennessee Valley Authority and Georgia Power Co.
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, no restraining orders or injunctions had been issued. Id. at 3-4.
The report estimated the combined legal expenses for the two cases at $10,000. Id. at 8.
131. Id.
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Authority Act was “to end this waste by making a wide distribution
of the benefits of this natural resource.”132 But as a result of the
injunctions, “three-quarters of all the power disposed of by the
[TVA] has been disposed of to the power companies. Thus, the
monopoly of Government-owned power which the act sought to end
has been perpetuated by injunction.”133 Moreover, “[r]epeated
injunctions threaten[ed] the continuity and dependability of [the
TVA’s] operations upon which the public trust and confidence”
rested.134 The result was that “[t]he operation of important provi-
sions of the act must ... be suspended until any possible doubt as to
the validity of any part of it is resolved by the Supreme Court.”135
This situation adversely affected “the attitude and morale” at the
TVA, and made it difficult to attract and retain quality personnel.136
A particularly irksome feature of Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority was the forum shopping that led to the
injunction. Democrats Hugo Black of Alabama and Kenneth
McKellar of Tennessee joined Nebraska Independent George Norris
in rising on the Senate floor to decry the peripatetic litigation that
ultimately tied the hands of the TVA.137 The senators explained that
the Georgia Power Company had filed suit in Georgia state court
seeking to enjoin the activities of the TVA in Georgia.138 The case
was removed to federal court, where Judge Samuel H. Sibley upheld
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act’s constitutionality and denied
the petition for a preliminary injunction.139 The Georgia Power
Company thereafter joined with eighteen other power companies in
filing suit for an injunction against the TVA in the Northern District
of Alabama.140 On the day before the hearing on the petition,
presumably out of concern that the relief requested would be denied,
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id. at 8-9; see also FED. POWER COMM’N, RESTRAINING ORDERS AND INJUNCTIONS
INSTITUTED AGAINST PUBLIC ELECTRIC PROJECTS, S. DOC. NO. 74-182, at 7-9, 19-23, 25, 38, 48
(1936).
137. See 81 CONG. REC. 479-80 (1937) (statements of Sens. Black, McKellar, and Norris).
138. Id. at 479 (statement of Sen. Black).
139. Id. at 480 (statements of Sens. McKellar and Norris).
140. Id.
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the companies dismissed the suit.141 Meanwhile, the nineteen
companies filed a similar suit in Tennessee state court.142 That suit
was removed to the federal district court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, but the judge there recused himself on the ground that
his wife owned stock in one of the power companies that was party
to the suit.143 The suit accordingly was transferred to the presiding
judge for the Middle District of Tennessee, who finally issued the
injunction.144 Thus, as Senator Norris summarized the situation,
“the power companies traveled around from one court to another,”145
“through Georgia, Alabama, and finally into Tennessee, hunting a
judge who was willing to grant their prayer.”146 That “sweeping
injunction,”147 complained Senator McKellar, “issued by a single
Federal district judge,”148 “stopped the entire T.V.A.”149 The federal
government, Senator Norris agreed, had “been made impotent and
helpless by injunctions issued at the behest of the private power
companies.”150
The NIRA and the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935
tasked the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works with
the development of low-cost housing projects around the country.151
The condemnation proceedings initiated pursuant to these develop-
ment plans resulted in district court rulings for the government.152
Several of these cases were brought in the Northern District of
Georgia, the Northern District of Ohio, the Middle District of
Alabama, the Southern District of Indiana, and the Northern
141. Id. (statement of Sen. Norris).
142. Id.
143. Id. (statements of Sens. McKellar and Norris).
144. See id.; id. at 1104-05 (statement of Sen. McKellar); id. at 2143 (statement of Sen.
Norris). The federal district court for the Northern District of Georgia responded by enjoining
enforcement of the Tennessee Power decree in Georgia. Id. at 479-80.
145. Id. at 480.
146. Id. at 2143.
147. Id. at 557.
148. Id. at 553.
149. Id. at 1105. It had the effect of “putting at naught” the statute establishing the TVA,
and “virtually halting and tying up the entire [TVA] program.” Id. at 553.
150. Id. at 2143.
151. See INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING ACTS OF CONGRESS, S. DOC. NO. 75-27, at 1-2
(1937).
152. See id.
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District of Illinois.153 But unfavorable decisions in the District of
Columbia and the Western District of Kentucky led to projects being
abandoned.154 Particularly troubling to the administration was the
Sixth Circuit decision affirming the judgment of the District Court
in Louisville.155 The PWA’s report complained that this decision
seriously hampered the Federal Emergency Administration of
Public Works in the acquisition of land for use in connection
with slum-clearance and low-rent housing projects ... by throw-
ing a cloud on the power to acquire such land by eminent
domain, thereby making the only safe method of land acquisition
that of purchase of necessary sites.156
As a result, “[n]umerous slum-clearance and low-rent housing proj-
ects had to be abandoned and proposed projects were not under-
taken because necessary land could not be acquired without resort
to the power of eminent domain.”157
The case of Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad involved
a joint bill in equity brought by 135 railroads to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934.158 That Act, which
rested on the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
established a compulsory retirement and pension system for em-
ployees of the railroad industry, financed by exactions imposed
upon railroad companies.159 The Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia held the Railroad Retirement Act unconstitutional and
issued an injunction;160 this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States.161 Congress responded by grounding the
program in its powers to tax and spend, separating the provisions
of the statute providing pensions for railroad employees from the
provisions imposing taxes on the railroads, thereby enacting the
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2-3.
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id.
157. Id. By contrast, suits seeking to enjoin construction of projects on land that already
had been acquired did not adversely affect the administration’s operations. Id. at 3-5.
158. See Railroad Retirement Act, ch. 868, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934).
159. Id. §§ 4, 6.
160. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 85; see also R.R. RET. BD., S. DOC. NO. 75-26, at 1-2.
161. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935).
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Railroad Retirement Act of 1935162 and the Carriers Taxing Act of
1935.163 The railroads then brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the
Carriers Taxing Act in the federal district court for the District of
Columbia, where they were again successful.164 Meanwhile, three
smaller railroads that were not parties to the Alton litigation had
been granted temporary injunctions or restraining orders pending
resolution of the appeal in the second Alton case.165
To be sure, the administration’s experience in the lower federal
courts was not uniformly negative. For example, Cummings re-
ported that “[a]lthough injunctions have been granted in particular
cases arising under the Railway Labor Act, as amended in 1934, it
cannot be said that any of these cases seriously interfered with the
effectiveness of the act. The act has been held constitutional
whenever challenged.”166 This was confirmed by the report of the
National Mediation Board, whose chairman added that “[t]he action
of the courts has uniformly strengthened the law and been of great
assistance in clarifying its administration.”167 Parties seeking to
enjoin the collection of taxes imposed by the Social Security Act
were similarly unsuccessful.168 Of the seven district courts that
ruled in such cases, six denied injunctions, and one granted a
restraining order.169 “The effect of that order,” Cummings explained,
had been merely “to relieve that particular complainant from paying
its taxes up to the present time.”170
Commissioner James Landis reported that administration of the
Securities Act of 1933 had not been seriously embarrassed by suits
seeking injunctive relief, as only three such suits had been
brought.171 In one of these cases, the prayer for a preliminary
injunction had been denied, which permitted the Commission’s
162. See ch. 812, 49 Stat. 967.
163. See ch. 813, 49 Stat. 974.
164. Alton R.R. Co. v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 16 F. Supp. 955, 959 (D.D.C. 1936).
165. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 85.
166. Id. at 86.
167. S. DOC. NO. 75-41, at 3.
168. S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 87.
169. Id.
170. Id. Similarly, in the only circuit court action in such a suit, the Fifth Circuit denied
stays pending appeals by complainants from the adverse decision of the district court for the
Northern District of Alabama. Id.; see also SOC. SEC. BD., S. DOC. NO. 75-28, at 1-2.
171. See S. DOC. NO. 75-43, at 1-2.
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investigation to continue.172 In the other two, the Commission had
not even contemplated any action against the plaintiffs.173 In one of
these, a motion to dismiss due to jurisdictional defects and improper
venue was still pending at the time of the report.174 In the other, the
plaintiff dismissed the suit without prejudice.175 The Commission
prevailed in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Wickham,176
where the federal district court for the District of Minnesota denied
the defendant’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and upheld the
statute as an exercise of the commerce power.177 Only in one case
was the Commission’s investigation impeded by stays pending
appeal from decisions adverse to the defendant.178
Landis reported a similar lack of judicial obstruction of the
Commission’s enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In one case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of section 15
of the Securities Exchange Act, which required registration of bro-
kers and dealers engaged in over-the-counter market transactions
in securities.179 Here again, the Commission did not contemplate
any action against the plaintiff under that section in this case
because the provision “was apparently inapplicable to him.”180 The
case in the meantime likely had become moot due to revisions to the
Securities Exchange Act Congress adopted in 1936.181 In a second
case, the stay pending appeal from a decision in the Southern
District of New York adverse to the defendant did not “seriously
retard[ ]” the Commission’s efforts because of the Second Circuit’s
prompt affirmance of the judgment of the lower court.182 In addition,
a provision of the Securities Exchange Act permitted any person
filing an application or report with the Commission to object to pub-
lic disclosure of the information contained within the application.183
172. Id. at 2.
173. See id. at 1-2.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2.
176. 12 F. Supp. 245, 249 (D. Minn. 1935).
177. See id.; S. DOC. NO. 75-43, at 2.
178. S. DOC. NO. 75-43, at 2-3.
179. Id. at 3-4.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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In approximately thirty of the cases in which the Commission
refused confidential treatment of the information, suits were filed
seeking review of the Commission’s determination in the circuit
courts of appeals.184 In twenty of those cases, the registrants secured
stays of Commission orders denying confidential treatment pending
a final determination by the court.185 As Landis pointed out,
however, those stays were redundant because the Commission had
adopted a rule providing “for such nondisclosure pending the
conclusion of proceedings for review.”186
Nor did injunctive relief substantially impede the enforcement of
the National Labor Relations Act. National Labor Relations Board
Chairman J. Warren Madden reported that eighty-three suits
seeking such relief were brought in the federal district courts.187
Temporary injunctions were granted in eighteen of those cases, and
permanent injunctions were issued in two.188 In the remaining fifty-
two suits, injunctive relief was denied.189 Of the twenty cases in
which injunctions were granted, the board appealed eighteen.190 Of
those eighteen cases, seven were reversed, three were affirmed, and
one was withdrawn because the temporary injunction below had
been dissolved.191 The remaining seven appeals were pending.192
Of the fifty-two district court decisions denying injunctions,
appeals were taken in twenty-three cases.193 Thirteen of those de-
cisions were affirmed in circuit courts of appeal, while none had
been reversed.194 Seven remained pending in the circuit courts,
while eight were pending in the Supreme Court.195 In three cases,
appeals had been withdrawn.196 The Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari in a case in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 75-29, at 1.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id.
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court’s denial of a petition for an injunction.197 Stays pending appeal
were granted in the Eighth Circuit, but denied in the Second, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits.198 Stays were granted by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, though on final hearing
the stays were vacated and the lower court’s denial of the injunc-
tions was affirmed.199 Thus, though there was some conflict among
the lower courts, Madden concluded that “the great weight of au-
thority in the district courts has been that the National Labor
Relations Board could not be enjoined.”200 Similarly, while the First
and Eighth Circuits held that the Board’s procedure could be en-
joined, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits held
the contrary.201
Meanwhile, several other less prominent components of the
administration’s program also escaped serious judicial embarrass-
ment.202 But there can be little doubt that officials in the Depart-
ments of Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, and the Interior, along with
the National Recovery Administration, the National Bituminous
Coal Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, the Works
Progress Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the
Railroad Retirement Board, as well as the senators that commis-
sioned each of their reports, believed that the granting of injunctive
relief by lower federal courts posed major and sometimes decisive
obstacles to the successful implementation of key elements of the
New Deal.
Despite the fact that the universal injunction had yet to emerge,
it appears that injunctive relief in the New Deal period was effective
either to prevent or to substantially hinder the execution of federal
law in three types of situations. With respect to the first two of these
categories, there was some overlap. The first category was where
there was a joint bill in equity brought by a critical mass of the
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. These included the Connally Hot Oil Act, S. DOC. NO. 75-42, at 41; the Economy Act
of 1932, id. at 42-43; the Gold Hoarding Act of March 9, 1933, and the Gold Reserve Act of
1934, id. at 44-45.
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regulated parties. This was the case, for example, with the suit to
restrain enforcement of the Railroad Retirement Act brought in the
District of Columbia;203 the suit to restrain enforcement of the
Cotton Control Act in Georgia;204 and the action to restrain execu-
tion of the act creating the TVA in Tennessee.205 It appears that in
these cases, the injunctive relief granted frustrated implementation
of the respective programs as effectively as a universal injunction
might have.
The second category, which, as mentioned, overlaps to some
extent with the first, was where the challenged program was region-
al in character. This was the case with respect to the TVA,206 the
Hot Oil provisions of the NIRA,207 and the Cotton Control Act.208 In
such cases, there was no need for a universal injunction in order to
prevent effective implementation of the programs. Shutting down
the TVA in the Tennessee Valley, enjoining enforcement of the Hot
Oil provisions in East Texas, and making it impossible to implement
the Cotton Control Act in Georgia and Texas, effectively prevented
federal regulators from attaining their policy goals.
The third and largest category involved cases in which relief was
granted in so many individual cases that the challenged program
could not be enforced effectively. This appears to have been the case
with the AAA,209 where sufficient revenue to fund the entire pro-
gram could not be collected; the NIRA210 and the Guffey Coal Act,211
where a combination of lower court injunctions and decisions de-
claring the acts unconstitutional made enforcement of the acts by
the government impossible; and the agricultural marketing provi-
sions of the AAA, where invalidation of marketing licenses in many
major metropolitan areas caused a breakdown of the program’s en-
forcement outside the districts in which injunctive relief had been
secured.212
203. See supra text accompanying notes 158-65.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 105-50.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 105-50.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 38-53.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 63-74.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 27-37.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88. With respect to this third category of cases,
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II. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES
A. Program Redesign
Congress employed a number of strategies in response to these
obstacles. One was to revise or reformulate these programs so as to
rectify their constitutional defects.213 The Hot Oil program was re-
enacted by the Connally Act in 1935, which did not contain the
delegation of power that had doomed section 9(c) of the NIRA.214 The
revised measure was upheld in every reported lower-court chal-
lenge215 and by the Supreme Court.216 In 1937, Congress reenacted
the price regulation provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act, but omitted the labor regulation provisions that the Court had
found unconstitutional.217 Again, the revised measure easily weath-
ered constitutional challenge.218 The AAA was revised so that it
regulated the marketing of agricultural commodities under the
commerce power rather than the production of commodities under
the fiscal powers.219 That revised statute was likewise sustained
upon judicial review.220
it appears that the emergence of the universal injunction lowered the direct litigation costs
required to frustrate implementation of federal programs. With respect to the overlapping
first two categories, the universal injunction reduces the coordination costs imposed by the
formulation of a joint bill in equity, and also creates significant opportunities for free riding.
213. I relate each of the stories contained in this paragraph in greater detail in Barry
Cushman, The Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79 (1998).
214. See Connally Hot Oil Act, ch. 18, 49 Stat. 30 (1935).
215. See Genecov v. Fed. Petroleum Bd., 146 F.2d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 1944); President of the
U.S. v. Skeen, 118 F.2d 58, 59 (5th Cir. 1941); Hurley v. Fed. Tender Bd. No. 1, 108 F.2d 574,
576 (5th Cir. 1939); Griswold v. President of the U.S., 82 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1936);
President of the U.S. v. Artex Refineries Sales Corp., 11 F. Supp. 189, 192 (S.D. Tex. 1935).
216. United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1939).
217. See Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937, ch. 127, 50 Stat. 72.
218. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 907, 912-14 (1940). Congress
similarly revised the Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934),
which was held unconstitutional by a unanimous Court in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935). The revised statute, Act of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792, 49
Stat. 942, was unanimously upheld in Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Tr. Bank, 300
U.S. 514, 456-57 (1937). See Cushman, supra note 213, at 81-84.
219. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, § 2, 52 Stat. 31.
220. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47-51 (1939).
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As indicated above, the revision of the Railroad Retirement Act
was the mirror image of the AAA reformulation—grounding the
statute in the fiscal powers rather than in the commerce power—but
with a twist. While the board’s appeal from the decision of the D.C.
Circuit invalidating the revised statute was pending, President
Roosevelt suggested that representatives from all of the major
railroads sit down with representatives from all of the major railway
unions to hammer out a pension deal satisfactory to all concerned.221
The resulting agreement was codified in the Carriers Taxing Act of
1937222 and the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937.223 Though sponsors
of the revised program professed their belief that each bill was con-
stitutional,224 California Democratic Representative Clarence Lea
assured his colleagues that “[f]riends of this legislation, in my
judgment, need not particularly fear ultimate Court disposal of this
problem.”225 For as Michigan Republican Representative Carl Mapes
explained: “It is agreed between the representatives of the railroads
and the brotherhoods that they will not contest the constitutionality
of this legislation ... and that they will use their influence against
having anyone else bring such action.”226 The parties kept their
agreement,227 and the retirement system that they created remains
with us in modified form today.228 Note, however, that in order for
Congress to achieve its legislative objective, it was necessary to
persuade the parties with standing not to challenge the program’s
constitutionality in court; it was clear that a single injunction issu-
ing from a single court in the District of Columbia could grind the
program’s administration to a halt.
Another strategy was to redesign a program so that no one would
have standing to challenge it. The benefit payments under the first
AAA were underwritten by an earmarked excise tax on processors
221. See Cushman, supra note 213, at 90, 107-09.
222. ch. 405, 50 Stat. 435.
223. ch. 382, 50 Stat. 307.
224. Cushman, supra note 213, at 90, 109 nn.112 & 114.
225. 81 CONG. REC. 6081 (1937).
226. Id. at 6087; see also Cushman, supra note 213, at 109 n.114.
227. See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59
HARV. L. REV. 645, 693 (1946) (reporting that the “validity” of the revised retirement program
“has never been challenged”).
228. See Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. § 231 (2012); I.R.C. §§ 3221-3232
(2012).
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because President Roosevelt insisted that the program “finance
itself” rather than draw on the Treasury’s general revenues.229 It
was this feature of the statute that provided standing to challenge
the program.230 After the Court struck down the processing tax, the
government continued to make the promised benefit payments to
farmers, but now out of general revenue.231 In 1923, the Court had
held unanimously that a taxpayer’s interest in the moneys of the
federal treasury was too “minute and indeterminable” to enable her
to invoke the power of equity to enjoin a federal program financed
by general revenues.232 Indeed, many of the New Deal’s spending
programs were designed so that they were financed from general
revenue, and thus insulated from judicial review by this “taxpayer
standing” doctrine.233
Congress took advantage of this feature of constitutional doctrine
in redesigning its agricultural program. Less than two months after
the Butler decision, Congress enacted the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act of 1936.234 The statute appropriated $500
million to pay farmers to shift their acreage from soil-depleting,
surplus crops to soil-building crops such as grasses and legumes.235
Over the objections of congressional opponents,236 the payments
under the Soil Conservation Act were made from general revenue
rather than from the proceeds of an earmarked tax, which meant
that no taxpayer had standing to challenge the program.237
229. RAYMOND MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL 250 (1966); see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 97 (1959).
230. See DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 180-81 (1937);
Cushman, supra note 213, at 91-92.
231. See ALFANGE, supra note 230, at 180-81.
232. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
233. See Cushman, supra note 213, at 91-92.
234. ch. 104, 49 Stat. 1148.
235. See id. §§ 7, 15-16.
236. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REC. 1771-98 (1936) (statement of Sen. Hastings).
237. FRANK FRIEDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 192 (1990);
Richard S. Kirkendall, The New Deal and Agriculture, in THE NEW DEAL: THE NATIONAL
LEVEL 83, 94 (John Braeman et al. eds., 1975); CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 838 (2d ed. 1954); Stern, supra note 227, at 689-90.
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B. Judicial Appointments
In addition to these adaptations through program redesign,
Congress and the administration pursued two other means of reduc-
ing resistance to the New Deal in the lower federal courts. When
1936 came to a close, there were forty-seven circuit court judge-
ships238 and 160 permanent Article III district court judgeships.239
By the end of that year, twelve Roosevelt appointees had been
confirmed to the federal courts of appeals, comprising slightly over
a quarter of the circuit court bench.240 At the district court level,
only thirty-five of Roosevelt’s nominees, comprising approximately
21.8 percent of the trial court bench, had been confirmed.241
Moreover, approximately one-third of those appointments had been
to districts in border states or states of the old Confederacy,242 where
Democrats tended to be more conservative than their Northern
counterparts. Just as he was denied the opportunity to make any
appointments to the Supreme Court during his first term,243
Roosevelt also had not yet been able to change the face of the lower
federal judiciary.
An additional means of increasing the number and proportion of
Roosevelt appointees was to increase the number of federal judge-
ships.244 The 74th Congress pursued this strategy with alacrity,
238. Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships—Courts of Appeals, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-history-
authorized-judgeships-courts-appeals [https://perma.cc/GXK5-YT8D].
239. Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships—District Courts, U.S. COURTS, https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-history-authorized-
judgeships-district-courts [https://perma.cc/C9XV-JBGC].
240. See Federal Judges Nominated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/federal_judges_nominated_by_Franklin_Delano_Roosevelt [https://perma.cc/
X98U-ZY9S].
241. List of Federal Judges Appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_federal_judges_appointed_by_Franklin_D._Roosevelt
[https://perma.cc/VAP5-63FA] (citing Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges,
1789-Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/XY9M-98LG]).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. An alternative was to create vacancies through impeachment of judges appointed by
Republican presidents. Democratic Representative Byron Scott of California pursued this
approach when on August 5, 1935, he introduced (by request) a House resolution calling for
investigation into the conduct of six lower court judges: three appointed by President Harding,
two by President Coolidge, and one by President Hoover. H.R. Res. 330, 74th Cong. (1935);
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creating eleven new district court judgeships and making perma-
nent fifteen temporary district court judgeships that had been
created in earlier years.245 During Roosevelt’s first term, Congress
also created a new judgeship for the Ninth Circuit and made a
temporary judgeship there permanent.246 Indeed, the pace at which
the Congress created new judgeships frequently attracted the criti-
cism of opponents.247 Members of the 75th Congress continued these
efforts to enlarge the personnel of the lower federal courts. By the
time President Roosevelt unveiled his Court-packing plan on
February 5, 1937,248 bills had been introduced to create eight new
district judgeships249 and four new circuit judgeships.250 The next
several months witnessed the introduction of bills to create an
79 CONG. REC. 12,766 (1935). The measure was referred to the Judiciary Committee and
proceeded no further.
245. See Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 696, 49 Stat. 1806; Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 695, 49 Stat.
1805; Act of June 22, 1936; ch. 694, 49 Stat. 1804; Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 693, 49 Stat. 1804;
Act of June 16, 1936, ch. 585, 49 Stat. 1523; Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 544, 49 Stat. 1491; Act
of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 793, 49 Stat. 945; Act of Aug. 19, 1935, ch. 558, 49 Stat. 659; Act of Aug.
2, 1935, ch. 425, 49 Stat. 508.
246. Act of Aug. 2, 1935, ch. 425, 49 Stat. 508; Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 102, 48 Stat. 310-
11.
247. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REC. 8749-50 (1936) (statement of Sen. Young); 80 CONG. REC. 5736
(1936) (statement of Sen. Wolcott); 79 CONG. REC. 14,244-45 (1935) (statement of Sen. Norris);
79 CONG. REC. 13,414-15 (1935) (statement of Sen. King); 79 CONG. REC. 11,354 (1935)
(statement of Rep. Truax).
248. SHESOL, supra note 1, at 284-85.
249. See H.R. 4345, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 875 (1937) (Western District of Virginia);
S. 1342, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 675 (1937) (Western District of Virginia); S. 838, 75th
Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 252 (1937) (creating a “mountain district” of Tennessee and a judgeship
therein); H.R. 2708, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 196 (1937) (Southern District of Texas); H.R.
2707, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 196 (1937) (Western District of Washington); S. 490, 75th
Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 111 (1937) (Southern District of Texas); S. 487, 75th Cong., 81 CONG.
REC. 111 (1937) (Western District of Washington); S. 364, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 70 (1937)
(District of North Dakota); S. 326, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 70 (1937) (District of New
Mexico); H.R. 257, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 30 (1937) (Eastern District of Michigan); H.R.
83, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 25 (1937) (Western District of New York).
250. S. 1192, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 547 (1937) (Fifth Circuit); S. 563, 75th Cong., 81
CONG. REC. 112 (1937) (creating a new Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and three
judgeships therein).
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additional three district court judgeships251 as well as three more
circuit judgeships.252
President Roosevelt’s Court-packing bill pursued this strategy
with a vengeance. The bill would have allowed the appointment of
up to fifty new judges to the federal courts.253 Because the bill would
have permitted up to six appointments to the Supreme Court—
precisely the number that President Roosevelt believed he needed
in order to have a “dependable Court”254—Roosevelt’s proposal
would have authorized the appointment of up to forty-four new
circuit and district court judges.255 Over time this would have
brought the total number of Roosevelt appointments to those courts
to 99 out of 255, or more than 35 percent of the lower federal
bench.256
While the President’s bill was pending, other bills to create addi-
tional judgeships made little headway. By year’s end, Congress had
created only three new judgeships: one for the Southern District of
Ohio, which had a rapidly expanding docket, so that Cincinnati
might have a resident federal district judge;257 and two for the Ninth
251. H.R. 8168, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 8348 (1937) (providing an additional district
judge in Connecticut); S. 2484, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 5047 (1937); H.R. 7280, 75th Cong.,
81 CONG. REC. 5096 (1937) (dividing the District of New Jersey into two judicial districts, and
creating a judgeship for the Southern District); S. 2010, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 2803
(1937) (providing an additional judge to the Southern District of Ohio).
252. H.R. 6907, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 4314 (1937) (one additional judgeship for the
Sixth Circuit); S. 1550, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 1271 (1937) (two additional judgeships for
the Ninth Circuit).
253. S. 1392, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 956 (1937); H.R. 4417, 75 Cong., 81 CONG. REC.
946 (1937); see also H.R. 4417, 75th Cong. (1937).
254. See Cushman, supra note 3, at 1, 16.
255. See 81 CONG. REC. 5384 (1937) (statement of Rep. Robsion of Kentucky) (“I am sure
the gentleman has read the President’s bill which provides for 44 roving judges hereinafter
to be appointed.”). Not all of these judgeships would have been created immediately. As of
February 5, 1937, there were only nineteen lower federal court judges who had reached retire-
ment age. S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 4 (1937).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41, 255.
257. See Act of Aug. 25, 1937, ch. 771, 50 Stat. 805; To Authorize the Appointment of an
Additional Judge for Southern District of Ohio: Hearing on S. 2010 Before Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 2, 11, 20 (1937) (statements of Rep. Harlan and Sen.
Bulkley); 81 CONG. REC. 9670 (1937) (statement of Rep. O’Brien); H.R. REP. NO. 75-1574, 81
CONG. REC. 9061 (1937); S. REP. NO. 75-709, 81 CONG. REC. 5638 (1937). The Judicial
Conference had recommended the creation of new district court judgeships for the Northern
District of Georgia, the Eastern District of Louisiana, the Southern District of Texas, and the
Western District of Washington. 1935 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 6.
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Circuit, where the volume of business had far outstripped the ca-
pacity of its judicial personnel.258 These were the only two Senate
bills on which the Judiciary Committee, which understandably was
preoccupied with the hearings on the Court-packing bill, took any
action. The House Judiciary Committee was chaired by Hatton
Sumners,259 who was publicly and vocally opposed to the President’s
bill, as were a majority of his colleagues on the Committee.260 They
took action on only two of the House bills. One was a bill to create
an additional judgeship for the shorthanded Sixth Circuit.261 That
bill was reported favorably in late July, but no further action was
taken.262 The other was Sumners’s own bill to create an additional
district court judgeship in his own State of Texas.263 That bill was
reported favorably by Sumners’s Committee on May 20,264 and
passed by the House on June 7,265 but the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee took no action on the bill.266 The Senate did not pass the bill for
the Southern District of Ohio until June 28,267 long after the
Judiciary Committee issued its adverse report on the Court-packing
bill.268 The House did not pass the bill until August 21,269 the last
day of the session, and well after the entire Court-packing crisis had
been resolved. The President’s effort to enlarge the lower federal
258. See Act of Apr. 14, 1937, ch. 80, 50 Stat. 64; A Bill to Provide for the Appointment of
Two Additional Circuit Judges for the Ninth Judicial Circuit: Hearing on S. 1550 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 1, 3, 14 (1937) (statements of Attorney
General Alexander Holtzoff and the Honorable William Denman, Ninth Circuit Judge); 81
CONG. REC. 3254 (1937) (statement of Mr. Sumners) (“I believe everybody who has examined
the situation agrees that it is imperative that that court have relief.”); H.R. REP. NO. 75-553,
81 CONG. REC. 3115 (1937); S. REP. NO. 75-201, 81 CONG. REC. 2319 (1937). For an extended
argument in favor of the creation of these judgeships, see the statement of California
Democratic Representative John H. Tolan, 81 CONG. REC. APP., at 746-47 (1937).
259. Committees of the 75th Congress: House Judiciary Committee, C-SPAN, https://www.c-
span.org/congress/committee/?2115&congress=75 [https://perma.cc/9ZKE-PVD7].
260. See ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 1, at 67, 88-89.
261. H.R. 6907, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 4314 (1937). 
262. H. REP. NO. 75-1390, at 1 (1937); H. REP. No. 75-1390, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 7858
(1937).
263. H.R. 2708, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 196 (1937).
264. H. REP. NO. 75-875, at 1 (1937); H. REP. No. 75-875, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 4894
(1937).
265. H.R. 2708, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 5383, 5386-87 (1937).
266. See H.R. 2708, 81 CONG. REC. 5403, 5409 (1937).
267. S. 2010, 81 CONG. REC. 6343, 6353 (1937).
268. S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 1 (1937).
269. S. 2010, 81 CONG. REC. 9672-73, 9675 (1937).
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judiciary in one fell swoop appears to have deterred, or at least
retarded, congressional efforts to do so on a retail basis.270
270. Democrat Randolph Joseph Cannon of Wisconsin sought to change the composition
of the lower federal courts by altering the manner in which their judges were selected. He
introduced a joint resolution in the House that would have amended the Constitution to
require that district and circuit court judges be “chosen by popular vote of the electors in each
district.” H.R.J. Res. 109, 75th Cong., at 5 (1937). The text of the amendment was proceeded
by a lengthy litany of “Whereas” clauses, including the following:
Whereas many of the Federal judges have become unresponsive to the will of the
people, are antagonistic and utterly opposed to the policies and spirit of the
Congress as set forth in legislation; and
Whereas such Federal judges do not intend to nor do they sincerely and honestly
enforce, interpret, and carry out the laws of the Congress, but they purposely
attempt to and do nullify beneficent legislation by deliberate misconstruction
and misinterpretation by flagrant, brazen disregard of plain, simple language;
and
Whereas such judges impede and harass the Government by misuse of
injunctions and other drastic writs; and
Whereas a typical instance of nullification by construction recently occurred
when a circuit court of appeals, in affirming a decision of a district judge,
emasculated the Norris-La Guardia Act, which was intended by Congress to
curb the Federal courts in discriminating against organized labor, and which
was passed after careful study by Congress and represented enlightened public
opinion; and
Whereas in this and many instances the Federal courts, created by the
Congress, failed to carry out the laws which are clearly within the constitutional
power of Congress; and
Whereas it is well known that many Federal judges are biased and prejudiced
against organized labor; and
Whereas history and experience have shown that a great many of the Federal
judges are bitter partisans and are secretly participants in politics; and ...
Whereas Federal judges nullify legislation of Congress affecting workingmen but
sustain the same legislation when it is for their own benefit, a pension law for
deserving railroad men who had given lives of toil to the railroads of the country
being held void but a pension for Federal judges giving them full salary after
only ten years of service upheld; and ...
Whereas the life-tenure provision of the United States Constitution has not only
failed to keep the Federal judges out of politics but has been the means of
protecting political judges in office and of affording them immunity for not only
wrongful, but oftentimes criminal activity in their courts; and ...
Whereas it is generally known that lawyers who have loyally served the
interests of the common people and fought against big interests have rarely been
appointed as Federal judges; and
Whereas the much discussed fear of Fascist dictatorship in our country has no
basis in the legislative and executive departments which are responsive to the
public will and subject to check by popular election, but Federal judicial
autocracy which has been established in the Government gives much ground for
apprehension; and
Whereas only popular election at stated intervals can provide the necessary
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Relatedly, on March 12, Democratic Senator Charles O. Andrews
of Florida introduced a joint resolution that would have created both
new lower court vacancies and added new circuit court judgeships.271
Andrews proposed to amend Article III of the Constitution in var-
ious respects, including by adding a provision for the mandatory
retirement of all federal judges at the age of seventy-five.272 “There
appears to be little doubt in the minds of many of those who seem
to be best entitled to know,” Andrews noted, “that the age of 75
should be the honored and accepted retiring date in the lives of a
great majority of men.”273 Andrews observed that this was “a policy
which has obtained in the Army and in the Navy,” and insisted that
there was “no reason why it should not apply to other officers of the
United States.”274 “The involuntary retirement of judges at the age
of 75 is desirable,” Andrews explained, “because judges, after years
on the bench, naturally sheltered from the everyday life experienced
by the ordinary citizen, get out of touch with the people.”275 Quoting
authorities ranging from former Attorney General William Wirt to
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Andrews concluded that
“there cannot be any serious doubt that 75 is a proper age for invol-
untary retirement.”276 Because there currently were seven circuit
judges who either had reached the age of seventy-five or would do
safeguards to obtain an honest, able, and just judiciary.
Id. at 2-5. The joint resolution was referred to the Judiciary Committee, but proceeded no
further. H.R.J. Res. 109, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 197 (1937). Cannon had introduced his
resolution in the preceding session, to the same effect. H.R.J. Res. 574, 74th Cong., 80 CONG.
REC. 6252 (1936).
271. See S.J. Res. 100, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 2138 (1937).
272. See S.J. Res. 100, 75th Cong. (1937). On February 15, Democratic Senator Allen J.
Ellender of Louisiana had introduced a joint resolution amending the Constitution to require
that all federal judges “shall be retired from all active duties upon reaching the age of seventy
years.” S.J. Res. 77, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 1195 (1937). On March 8, Mississippi
Democratic Representative John E. Rankin had introduced a joint resolution amending the
Constitution “to authorize Congress to prescribe fixed terms of office for judges of the
Supreme and inferior courts of the United States.” H.R.J. Res. 267, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC.
1992 (1937). Each joint resolution was referred to the respective Judiciary Committee, but
proceeded no further.
273. S.J. Res. 100, 81 CONG. REC. 2616-17 (1937).
274. Id. at 2617.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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so by May of 1937,277 ratification would have created seven vacan-
cies almost immediately.
Andrews’s amendment also sought to make the circuit courts
“more representative” by providing that they should thereafter
consist of at least one judge from each state included within the
territory comprising the circuit.278 Under the circumstances then
obtaining, this would have resulted in the appointment of eleven
new circuit judges.279 Andrews concluded that “[i]t would take many
more judges to put into effect the recommendation of the President
than would be required if and when the constitutional amendment
I have suggested should be adopted.”280
No action was taken on the joint resolution, and Andrews intro-
duced modified versions of his proposal on three separate occasions
between May and August.281 The last of these versions retained the
requirement concerning the composition of circuit courts, but ex-
empted all judges sitting at the time of the amendment’s ratification
from its mandatory retirement provision.282 Andrews took to the
floor to reiterate his view that amending the Constitution to compel
retirement at seventy-five “would permanently dispose of a recur-
ring embarrassing controversy,”283 but his proposal received no
further attention.
C. Reform of Judicial Procedure
The other strategy pursued by Congress was to reform judicial
procedure and/or jurisdiction in ways that would inhibit the pow-
er of lower federal courts to thwart implementation of federal
programs. Many such proposals were introduced in the weeks
preceding Roosevelt’s announcement of his plan to enlarge the
lower federal judiciary. For instance, Pennsylvania Democratic
277. Id. at 2619.
278. Id. at 2618.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2619.
281. S.J. Res. 100, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 9416 (1937) (proposed by Sen. Andrews, Aug.
20, 1937); S.J. Res. 100, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 5517 (1937) (proposed by Sen. Andrews,
June 7, 1937); S.J. Res. 100, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 4229 (1937) (proposed by Sen.
Andrews, May 6, 1937).
282. See 81 CONG. REC. 9416 (1937).
283. Id. at 9417.
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Representative Francis Eugene Walter introduced a bill providing
that, in any case in which neither the United States nor any of its
officers or employees was a party to the suit, where the court
declared any federal statute invalid, the clerk of the court was
required to certify that fact to the Attorney General.284 The Attorney
General or his representative then would have the same right to
appeal the judgment as if the United States had been party to the
suit.285 Moreover, upon motion by the Attorney General or his
representative that the record in the case was inadequate for
appellate review, the appellate court was instructed to remand the
case to the proper court with direction that the United States be
given the opportunity to present evidence and offer arguments
concerning the statute’s validity.286 The lower court was directed to
expedite any such remanded suit and to preserve the status quo
ante “in every way possible.”287 The Attorney General or his
representative was directed to invoke appellate jurisdiction in such
cases, and to appear and argue on behalf of the United States.288
Senator Hugo Black of Alabama and Representative John E.
Rankin of Mississippi, both Democrats, introduced bills that pro-
vided for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any lower court
restraining order, decree, judgment, or injunction prohibiting the
enforcement, operation, or execution of any federal law.289 The bills
would have required the record in the case to be sent to the Court
within ten days of the filing of a notice of appeal, and instructed the
Court to give such appeals “preferential consideration.”290 Two other
Democrats, Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee and Repre-
sentative Frank Hancock, Jr., of North Carolina, sponsored bills
that would have prohibited the lower federal courts from issuing
284. H.R. 4362, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 875 (1937).
285. H.R. 4362, 75th Cong. (1937).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. H.R. 3593, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 405 (1937); S. 877, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC.
253 (1937).
290. H.R. 3593, 75th Cong. (1937); S. 877, 75th Cong. (1937). A comparable bill authorizing
direct Supreme Court review of district court rulings on the constitutionality of federal
statutes had been introduced by Progressive Senator Robert La Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin in
the preceding Congress. S. 3211, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 10,721 (1935). The bill was
referred to the Judiciary Committee, where no further action was taken.
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any injunction restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution
of an act of Congress “unless and until such Act shall have been held
finally invalid by the Supreme Court.”291 Farmer-Laborite Represen-
tative Henry Tiegan of Minnesota offered a measure that would
have deprived the lower federal courts of jurisdiction to declare any
federal statute unconstitutional, required that any such claim by a
party be immediately certified to the Supreme Court for decision,
and stayed all proceedings in the case until the decision had been
certified back.292 The bill also provided that, with respect to all cases
currently pending in the Supreme Court, and in all cases pending
there in the future, the concurrence of three-fourths of the Justices
would be required before any judgment should be entered pronounc-
ing a federal statute unconstitutional.293 Meanwhile, Democratic
Representatives Charles Faddis of Pennsylvania and Harry B.
Coffee of Washington State introduced bills that would have pro-
hibited all federal courts, including the Supreme Court, from con-
sidering or passing upon pleas challenging the constitutionality of
federal statutes.294
291. H.R. 3902, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 542 (1937); S. 1174, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC.
477 (1937). Representative Rankin had introduced a more detailed version of such a bill ear-
lier in the session. H.R. 2295, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 140 (1937).
292. H.R. 3895, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 542 (1937).
293. H.R. 3895, 75th Cong. (1937). In the previous Congress, West Virginia Democrat
Robert L. Ramsay had introduced a bill that would have deprived all inferior federal courts
of jurisdiction to declare congressional statutes unconstitutional. H.R. 10839, 74th Cong., 80
CONG. REC. 1426 (1936). Earlier in that same Congress, Ramsay had introduced a similar bill
that also would have required that all constitutional questions raised in lower federal courts
be certified directly to the Supreme Court. H.R. 8054, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 7545 (1935).
Independent Senator George Norris of Nebraska and Illinois Democrat Donald C. Dobbins
each had introduced joint resolutions that would have amended the Constitution to vest
exclusive jurisdiction over questions of the constitutionality of congressional acts in the
Supreme Court of the United States. S.J. Res. 149, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 9415 (1935);
H.J. Res. 287, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 7546 (1935).
294. H.R. 4279, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 820 (1937); H.R. 2284, 75th Cong., 81 CONG.
REC. 139 (1937). These bills were anticipated by several measures introduced in the preceding
Congress that would have deprived all federal courts of power to declare federal laws un-
constitutional. See H.J. Res. 329, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 9506 (1935); H.J. Res. 301, 74th
Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 8213 (1935); H.J. Res. 296, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 7890 (1935); H.J.
Res. 462, 74th Cong., 80 CONG. REC. 770 (1936); H.R. 9478, 75th Cong., 80 CONG. REC. 32
(1936). H.J. Res. 329 also would have repealed the Tenth Amendment, while H.J. Res. 301
provided that any judge purporting to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional would be
deemed to have vacated his office. H.R. 10315, 74th Cong., 80 CONG. REC. 549 (1936), would
have prohibited federal courts (except for the Supreme Court exercising its original
jurisdiction) from hearing cases in which a party sought to have an act of Congress declared
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Roosevelt’s Court-packing bill was transmitted to Congress on
February 5, accompanied by a message explaining and defending his
recommended legislation.295 At the conclusion of his message,
Roosevelt raised a “further matter” not addressed by his bill, but
which nevertheless required “immediate attention.”296 The President
lamented “conflicting decisions in both trial and appellate courts on
the constitutionality of every form of important legislation,” which
had brought “the entire administration of justice dangerously near
to disrepute.”297 Such conflicts often persisted for a year or more
pending their ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court, making
the rights of citizens under federal law vary according to their
locations. Such persistent conflicts deprived the law of “its most
indispensable element—equality.”298 Moreover, the lack of legal
clarity during these periods deprived labor, industry, agriculture,
and commerce of “another essential of justice—certainty.”299
Finally, Roosevelt complained,
We find the processes of government itself brought to a com-
plete stop from time to time by injunctions issued almost au-
tomatically, sometimes even without notice to the Government,
and not infrequently in clear violation of the principle of equity
that injunctions should be granted only in those rare cases of
manifest illegality and irreparable damage against which the
ordinary course of the law offers no protection.300
As a result, federal statutes were “set aside or suspended for long
periods of time, even in cases to which the Government [was] not a
party.”301 Such “[g]overnment by injunction” laid “a heavy hand
upon normal processes.”302 For “no important statute” could “take
effect—against any individual or organization with the means to
invalid on the ground that it exceeded Congress’s powers to regulate commerce, to tax, or to
regulate the value of money, or on the ground that it denied substantive due process. Each
of these measures was referred to the Judiciary Committee, and received no further attention. 
295. H.R. DOC. NO. 75-142, at 9-11 (1937).
296. Id. at 5.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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employ lawyers” and to engage in “wide-flung litigation—until it
ha[d] passed through the whole hierarchy of the courts.”303 Thus,
“the judiciary, by postponing the effective date of acts of Congress,
[was] assuming an additional function and [was] coming more and
more to constitute a scattered, loosely organized, and slowly
operating third house of the National Legislature.”304
In response to this state of affairs, Roosevelt offered two recom-
mendations. The first was for a federal statute providing “that no
decision, injunction, judgment, or decree on any constitutional
question be promulgated by any Federal court without previous and
ample notice to the Attorney General and an opportunity for the
United States to present evidence and be heard.”305 The second was
for a statute providing for “a direct and immediate appeal to the
Supreme Court” in “cases in which any court of first instance
determines a question of constitutionality,” and “that such cases
take precedence over all other matters pending” in the Supreme
Court.306 “[I]f we assure Government participation in the speedier
consideration and final determination of all constitutional ques-
tions,” Roosevelt concluded, “we shall go a long way toward our high
objectives.”307
Bills embodying these recommendations had been introduced
before the announcement of the Court-packing plan,308 and similar
bills continued to be introduced thereafter. On February 10, Senator
McKellar introduced a bill mandating joinder of the United States
in all cases challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute,
prohibiting both state and lower federal courts from issuing any
TRO, preliminary injunction, or interlocutory injunction in such
cases, and providing for expedited direct appeals to the Supreme
Court in such a case.309 On February 18, Texas Democratic Repre-
sentative William D. McFarlane submitted a bill restating the
provisions of the earlier McKellar/Hancock bill, and adding a section
providing for expedited direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
303. Id. at 5-6.
304. Id. at 6.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See supra notes 284-94.
309. S. 1437, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 1081 (1937).
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district court judgments and decrees holding any part of a federal
statute unconstitutional.310 Under this bill, in cases where the
United States had not been a party to the district court proceeding,
the Attorney General or his representative was to have the same
right to seek such review as if the United States had been a party.311
That same day, California Democratic Representative Jerry Voorhis
introduced a bill stripping the state courts and the lower federal
courts of all jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court of appellate ju-
risdiction, to entertain cases in which a party questioned the con-
stitutionality of any federal statute on the ground that it violated
nonprocedural rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, or in which a party questioned the constitutionality
of any federal statute purporting to be an exercise of the powers
granted by the Commerce, Taxing, General Welfare, or Monetary
Clauses of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.312 And on
February 24, Democratic Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach of
Washington State submitted a measure requiring that the Attorney
General or his representative be notified of and given the opportu-
nity to appear at any hearing on a motion for an order restraining
or enjoining the enforcement of or compliance with any provision of
an act of Congress.313 The bill also provided for expedited, direct
appeal of any such order to the Supreme Court.314
Of these bills introduced during the first two months of 1937, only
McKellar’s February 10 bill received so much as a committee
report,315 and, at the request of several members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, that bill was recommitted the day after it was
reported to the floor.316 Two other measures did receive some
consideration on the Senate floor, however. In 1935, Hugo Black
introduced a bill identical to the one he introduced in 1937,
providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of district court
310. H.R. 4899, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 1390 (1937).
311. Id.
312. H.R. 4900, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 1390 (1937). Democrat John A. Martin of
Colorado had introduced a similar measure in the previous session. H.R. 10128, 74th Cong.,
80 CONG. REC. 366 (1936).
313. S. 1767, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 1776 (1937).
314. Id.
315. See generally S. REP. NO. 125, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 1520 (1937).
316. 81 CONG. REC. 1585 (1937) (statement of Sen. Neely). 
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decisions restraining enforcement of a federal law.317 The Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on the bill, at which Chief Justice Hughes
and Justices Willis Van Devanter and Louis D. Brandeis appeared
and testified.318 Apart from concerns about some of the bill’s details,
the jurists raised three more general objections to the measure.
First, they maintained it was unnecessary because the Court
already had authority to grant certiorari immediately in any such
case appealed to the circuit court and, thus, to provide review of the
district court’s action before the circuit court had acted.319 In fact,
the Chief Justice related that the Court had done so recently on
several occasions in cases raising important questions.320 In such
cases, the Court granted the writ within one to four weeks of the
submission of the petition, and delays in hearing argument were
attributable to the government asking for additional time to
prepare.321
Second, Hughes explained, in many cases, the bill actually would
delay ultimate resolution of the merits issue, because in cases in-
volving TROs and interlocutory injunctions, the sole issue for the
Court would be whether the trial judge had abused his discre-
tion.322 It would be extraordinarily rare for such abuse to be found
by the Court, which would simply leave the order in place and
remand the case for decision on the merits.323 Thus, the bill would
“tend to be dilatory” and “would defeat the purpose which the
measure has in view.”324 Finally, Hughes observed, allowing a direct
appeal of right in all such cases “would impose a very heavy burden
upon the Supreme Court.”325 Only cases involving very important
questions of law should be reviewed by the Court, Hughes main-
tained, and surely many cases that would be covered by the bill did
not fall within that category.326 Many such cases could be dealt with
317. S. 2176, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 2994 (1935).
318. See Appeals from Federal Courts, Hearing on S. 2716 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 2716, 74th Cong. 1-10 (1935).
319. See id. at 2-3, 9-10.
320. See id. at 3-4.
321. See, e.g., id.
322. Id. at 5.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 6.
325. Id.
326. See id. at 6-7.
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adequately in the circuit courts.327 The existing discretion to review
important cases by certiorari was sufficient and preferable to the
scheme proposed by Black’s bill.328
In rebuttal, Black argued that the Court was not reviewing the
decisions of district courts quickly enough.329 Black was particularly
concerned about the state of the TVA, whose activities were “now
paralyzed by court injunction” forbidding them to sell power to a
municipality.330 It was unlikely that the Court would act on an
appeal from the district court’s injunction until the following term,
with the result that “thousands of kilowatts of power” produced at
the Muscle Shoals plant were “going to waste”331 and “[l]osses of
millions of dollars” would “be suffered, which could be avoided by a
decision of the court formally settling the disputed questions of
law.”332 By contrast, under his bill, Black maintained that “the case
could be presented within a very few weeks and the result would be
the least possible disorganization of the T.V.A.”333 As to Hughes’s
second objection to the bill, Black was content to amend the bill so
that it did not apply to TROs and interlocutory injunctions.334 And
as for the feared burden on the Court, Black was confident that the
Attorney General could be trusted to exercise appropriate judgment
in determining which cases to appeal.335
Black’s bill proceeded no further in the 74th Congress, but he
introduced it again on January 15, 1937.336 The Senator observed
that
at the present time the Tennessee Valley Authority is specifi-
cally restrained from practically any and all action until a
restraining order shall be finally acted upon by a judge, and
perhaps until it shall reach its devious way on up to the Su-
preme Court of the United States. As a result, numerous
327. See id. at 7.
328. See id. at 8; see also id. at 9-10 (testimony of Justice Van Devanter).
329. See id. at 12.
330. Id. at 13.
331. Id. at 18.
332. Id. at 13.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 17.
335. See id.
336. See S. 877, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 259 (1937).
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municipalities are deprived of the privilege of obtaining loans
provided by the Government and are likewise deprived of the
privilege of operating their own municipal plants.337
Black’s bill was an effort “to bring about immediate action by the
Supreme Court when laws affecting 128,000,000 people are sus-
pended by injunctive process or by restraining orders of an inferior
court,” so that “the rights of the people shall not be taken away from
them any longer than is necessary.”338 The Alabamian noted that
when the enforcement of the A.A.A. law was restrained, hun-
dreds of suits were filed all over the United States. These
required the time of the Attorney General’s office, the judges,
the clerks, and thousands and thousands of dollars were spent
in these lawsuits to determine the constitutionality of the law.
If there had been a method of speedy determination provided,
that long delay and unnecessary expense would have been
obviated.339
Senator Ashurst reminded Black of Hughes’s testimony before the
Judiciary Committee indicating that such a method of speedy deter-
mination already existed, and that Black’s bill was therefore
unnecessary340—a theme that would be pursued at greater length by
Vermont Republican Warren Austin in a Senate speech on April
9.341 Black responded that two recent cases showed the necessity for
his bill.342 In a TVA case from North Carolina, the Court sent the
case back to the district court because “the record was not com-
plete.”343 In another case, the Court refused to grant certiorari from
a decision sustaining a challenge to the Social Security Act.344
Ashurst assured Black that “at a most early date,” he would receive
an invitation to appear before a Judiciary subcommittee to testify
337. 81 CONG. REC. 259 (1937).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 260.
340. See id. at 260-61.
341. See id. at 3327-28.
342. Id. at 261.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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with respect to his bill,345 but events took a different course and
Black’s bill made no further progress.
The second bill discussed on the Senate floor was McKellar’s bill
prohibiting the lower federal courts from issuing any injunction
restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of an act of
Congress “unless and until such Act shall have been held finally
invalid by the Supreme Court.”346 The Tennessee Senator explained
that the principal motivation for his proposal was the role that in-
junctive relief had played in frustrating the operations of the
TVA.347 But on February 10, several Senators contended or sug-
gested that denying lower federal courts the power to grant
immediate injunctive relief in cases of irreparable injury would
deprive litigants of their liberty or property without due process,348
and McKellar’s bill received no further consideration.
Instead, the bill that ultimately would embody the judicial
reforms of 1937 originated in the House. H.R. 2260 was introduced
by Representative Sumners on January 8, nearly a month before
Roosevelt announced his own proposal.349 In its initial form, the bill
provided that in any federal court proceeding to which neither the
United States nor one of its agencies, officers, or employees was a
party, and where the validity of a federal law was drawn into
question, the court having jurisdiction was required to certify that
fact to the Attorney General if the court believed that there were
substantial grounds for the challenge.350 The Attorney General or
his representative then was directed to appear in the proceeding,
where he was to have the right to introduce evidence and offer
argument, and to “have the same rights as a party to the extent
345. Id.
346. S. 1174, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 477, 482 (1937).
347. See 81 CONG. REC. 1104-05 (1937).
348. See id. at 1106-07 (statement of Sen. Tydings); id. at 1104 (statement of Sen. Adams);
id. at 1102 (statement of Sen. Austin); id. at 1096, 1099, 1101 (statement of Sen. King).
Senator King also contended at length that denying lower federal courts the power to issue
injunctions would deprive them of a portion of the judicial power with which they were
endowed by the Constitution upon their creation by Congress, and would thus be
unconstitutional. See id. at 1093-96. However, this claim does not appear to have resonated
with his colleagues, who regarded it as inconsistent with established precedent. See id. at
1099-100; see also S. REP. NO. 125, at 2-8 (1937) (memorandum by Sen. McKellar).
349. See H.R. 2260, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 139 (1937).
350. H.R. 2260, 75th Cong. (1937).
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necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to
the constitutionality of the statute.”351 If the court ruled against the
validity of the federal law, the government was to have the same
right of appeal as if it had been a party to the proceeding.352
The bill was reported back favorably with amendments on
February 9.353 The criterion for notification and participation of the
Attorney General was changed from a challenge to the “validity” of
the law to a challenge to the “constitutionality” of the law.354 The
amended bill also contained a provision authorizing the Attorney
General to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from any “final or
interlocutory judgment, decree, or order, or from an intermediate
order,” and further provided that “appeals so taken shall have
precedence over other cases in the Supreme Court.”355 With respect
to this new provision, the report remarked, “[T]he importance to the
Nation of prompt determination by the court of last resort of dis-
puted questions of the constitutionality of acts of the Congress
requires no comment.”356
The bill was debated on April 7.357 Sumners explained that the
objective of the bill was to ensure that the interests of the United
States were adequately represented in litigation challenging the
constitutionality of federal law.358 As the discussion proceeded,
Sumners’s language became more colorful. “It is ridiculous,” he
insisted, “that the final determination as to the constitutionality of
an act of Congress be held in abeyance for 2 or 3 years and nobody
knows whether or not it is constitutional.”359 Also “ridiculous,” he
argued, was “that the defense of the constitutionality of things you
and I do here under our duty as national legislators should be left
entirely to some little 2-by-4 lawyer in a private litigation, with
nobody there to speak in behalf of the Congress of the United
351. Id. at 2.
352. Id.
353. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-212, at 1, 81 CONG. REC. 1067 (1937).
354. H.R. REP. NO. 75-212, at 1.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 2. On February 24, Republican Earl C. Michener of Michigan indicated that
Roosevelt wished to have the bill considered by the House. See 81 CONG. REC. 1562 (1937).
357. 81 CONG. REC. 3254-55, 3257-59 (1937).
358. Id.; see also id. at 3266 (statement of Rep. Celler).
359. Id. at 3269.
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States.”360 Tennessee Democrat Walter Chandler reminded his
colleagues that provisions for direct appeals from district courts to
the Supreme Court already were provided in cases involving the
antitrust laws, the Packers and Stockyards Act, and orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.361 Sumners’s bill, he argued,
simply extended that principle to all cases in which a district court
ruled against the constitutionality of a federal law.362
The bill was amended on the floor to provide that direct appeals
to the Supreme Court would take precedence only over non-
constitutional cases pending before the Court,363 and that such
direct appeals also would lie in cases to which the United States or
one of its agencies, officers, or employees was a party.364 The bill
then was passed by a vote of 122 to 14.365 On April 9, the bill was
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee,366 where it was placed
on ice pending resolution of the fate of the President’s bill.
On May 18, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to report the
President’s bill adversely with the recommendation that it not
pass.367 On June 14, the Committee issued its report.368 The bulk of
the document focused on the Supreme Court issue, but the report
also identified two other deficiencies in the bill. The first was that
the proposal did nothing to address “the alleged abuse of the power
of injunction by some of the Federal courts” raised in the President’s
February 5 accompanying message to Congress.369 The report noted:
Nothing in this measure attempts to control, regulate, or
prohibit the power of any Federal court to pass upon the
constitutionality of any law—State or National.
Nothing in this measure attempts to control, regulate, or
prohibit the issuance of injunctions by any court, in any case,
whether or not the Government is a party to it.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 3273.
362. Id.
363. See id. at 3269-70.
364. See id. at 3272.
365. Id. at 3273.
366. Id. at 3313.
367. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 1, at 208-09.
368. See S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 1, 81 CONG. REC. 5639 (1937).
369. S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 3.
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If it were to be conceded that there is need of reform in these
respects, it must be understood that this bill does not deal with
these problems.370
Second, the increase in lower court judges was conditioned en-
tirely upon the incumbent’s age and unwillingness to retire, rather
than “in relation to the increase of work in any district or circuit.”371
Meanwhile, the “facts indicate[d] that the courts with the oldest
judges ha[d] the best records in the disposition of business.”372 The
twenty-four lower court judges of retirement age were “either alto-
gether equal to their duties or [were] commissioned in courts” with
no congestion.373 Therefore, it was “obvious that the way to attack
congestion and delay in the courts ... directly” was not the method
proposed by the President, but instead “by legislation which [would]
increase the number of judges in those districts” where there was an
“accumulation of litigation.”374
By now it was clear that the President’s bill could not pass the
Senate, so proponents of judicial reform went back to the drawing
board. On July 2, Democratic Senators Ashurst, Carl Hatch of New
Mexico, and M.M. Logan of Kentucky introduced an amendment in
the nature of a substitute for Roosevelt’s proposal.375 The substitute
bill would have allowed the President to appoint an additional
Justice to the Supreme Court for each Justice who had reached the
age of seventy-five without retiring, with the qualification that no
more than one such additional Justice could be appointed in any
calendar year.376 Additional lower court judges still could be ap-
pointed for any such judge who had reached the age of seventy
without retiring, though the number of such additional appoint-
ments was now capped at twenty.377
The bill was in most other respects very similar to the bill that
the President had proposed, with the exception that it now added an
370. Id.
371. Id. at 4.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. S. 1392, 81 CONG. REC. 6740 (1937).
376. Id.
377. Id.
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entirely new “Title II,” which was a mildly modified version of
Sumners’s H.R. 2260.378 The House bill had been amended to allow
the United States to intervene formally in the district court pro-
ceeding and to become a party.379 The government was authorized
to appeal directly to the Supreme Court any adverse judgment,
decree, or order of a district court that was based in whole or in part
upon a decision that a federal law was unconstitutional.380 Any such
direct appeal was, upon motion of the government, to “be advanced
to a speedy hearing.”381
In the contentious debate that unfolded over the following two
weeks, the provisions of the bill relating to the lower federal courts
were scarcely mentioned.382 The focus was, understandably, on the
provisions relating to the size of the Supreme Court.383 On July 22,
following the death and funeral of Senate Majority Leader Joseph
Robinson of Arkansas—who had been promised the next seat on the
Court should the substitute bill become law384—the Senate Judiciary
Committee reached an agreement to recommend that the Senate
recommit the bill, with instructions to the Committee to report a
judicial reform bill within ten days.385 The senators agreed that in
the Committee’s deliberations “no consideration” was to be given “to
adding judges to the Supreme Court or to any court on any other
basis than that of need in order to perform the functions of the
court.”386 As Logan put it in response to a question from Republican
378. See id. at 6741.
379. Compare id., with id. at 3272.
380. Id. at 6741.
381. Id. Kentucky Democrat Fred M. Vinson introduced a companion measure in the House
on July 6. H.R. 7765, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 6869 (1937).
382. For brief and inconsequential exceptions, see 81 CONG. REC. 7376, 7381 (1937) (speech
of Sen. Logan); id. at 6905 (colloquy between Sens. Burke and Logan); id. at 6904 (colloquy
between Sens. Overton and Logan); see also id. at 6910 (Sen. Logan referencing portions of
the Judiciary Committee’s adverse report on the President’s bill regarding one of the bill’s
provisions concerning lower federal courts).
383. Id. at 6787-813, 6873-90, 6894-922, 6966-82, 7018-27.
384. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 1, at 156-58; 2 HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY
OF HAROLD L. ICKES 153 (1954); Leuchtenburg, supra note 1, at 100; SHESOL, supra note 1,
at 309; SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 200; SOLOMON, supra note 1, at 185-86; Joseph Alsop, Jr. &
Turner Catledge, Joe Robinson, The New Deal's Old Reliable, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Sept.
26, 1936, at 5; Good Soldier, TIME, July 1935, at 19-21.
385. 81 CONG. REC. 7375, 7381 (1937).
386. Id. at 7382.
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Senator Hiram Johnson of California, “the Supreme Court is out of
the way.”387 The motion carried by a vote of 70 to 20.388
On July 28, the Senate Judiciary Committee complied with the
Senate’s instructions by reporting back an amended version of
Sumners’s House bill.389 The Senate’s version of the bill also
required notification of the Attorney General when a substantial
constitutional question was raised in private litigation, but it did
not authorize the government to appear unless it had become a
party, and it permitted the government to intervene and become a
party only upon a showing that it had “a legal interest or may have
a probable interest.”390 This language, the report explained, was
“intended to make the right of intervention and appeal ... coexten-
sive with the judicial power of courts of the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over cases and controversies.”391 Such interests were
“not limited to pecuniary interest,” but also extended “to rights and
duties related to sovereignty.”392 The United States was not
excluded
from drawing the judicial power to its proper assistance either
as an original party, or as an intervenor, when, in private
litigation, decision of the constitutional question may affect the
public at large, may be in respect of matters which by the
387. Id. at 7381.
388. Id.
389. S. REP. NO. 75-963, at 1, 81 CONG. REC. 7714 (1937). For the text of the amended bill,
see 81 CONG. REC. 8514 (1937).
390. S. REP. NO. 75-963, at 1-2.
391. Id. at 2. The report continued, “The Federal courts cannot have jurisdiction, even
though a constitutional question be involved, without a real case or controversy, properly
brought before the court, and in which a decision is required by the circumstances.” Id. at 3.
For elaboration of this point, see 81 CONG. REC. 8507-12 (1937) (statement of Sen. Austin).
392. S. REP. NO. 75-963, at 2. Here the report quoted a passage from In re Debs:
Every government, entrusted by the very terms of its being with powers and
duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to
apply to its own courts for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and
the discharge of the other * * * Whenever the wrongs complained of are such as
affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which by the Constitution
are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and concerning which the Nation owes
a duty to all the citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere
fact that the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not
sufficient to exclude it from the courts or to prevent it from taking measures
therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties.
Id. (quoting In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584, 586 (1895)).
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Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and
concerning which the Nation owes a duty to all the citizens of
securing to them their common rights.393
But it was necessary that the government have such an interest,
because Congress could not “empower the Attorney General to inter-
vene without becoming a party because the Federal court can only
have jurisdiction to hear and dispose of a case or controversy
properly before the Court, that is, in an action brought by one fully
entitled to sue and by a proper proceeding.”394 Nor could Congress
“empower the Attorney General to appeal a case in which the
United States is not a party,” nor “to take a question of constitution-
ality to the Supreme Court in a case solely between citizens after it
has been closed by judgment and is no longer a controversy.”395 The
judicial power did not “comprehend the giving of advice to any other
department of Government.”396
The Senate version of the bill retained the right of the govern-
ment to appeal an adverse constitutional holding directly to the
Supreme Court, and provided that such appeals were “to be heard
by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time and [were] to
take precedence over all other matters not of a like character.”397
But a new section of the bill concerned an issue on which Roosevelt
had called for action, but which neither the House bill nor the
Logan/Ashurst/Hatch bill had addressed. Section 3 made provision
“for hearing and determination by a court composed of three judges”
in cases in which a party sought injunctive relief against the en-
forcement, operation, or execution of any act of Congress on the
ground that it was unconstitutional.398 At least one of these judges
was required to be a circuit judge, and the Attorney General was
required to be notified of the pending hearing.399 The report ex-
plained that such three-judge panels already were prescribed for
393. Id. at 3-4.
394. Id. at 2. The report also stated, “The judicial power does not extend to appeals by
persons not parties to a case or a controversy, who intervene to invoke it solely for the purpose
of review of an act of Congress.” Id. at 3.
395. Id. at 2.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 4.
398. Id. (emphasis added).
399. 81 CONG. REC. 8514 (1937).
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injunctive proceedings involving orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and for cases in federal court concerning the validity
of state statutes.400 Between the time that the application for
injunctive relief was made and the time that the three-judge panel
was assembled, the judge to whom the application was made was to
have authority to issue a TRO.401 Section 3 further authorized direct
appeal to the Supreme Court from any order granting or denying
injunctive relief in such a case.402 Thus, rather than depriving the
lower federal courts of power to enjoin the execution of federal law,
the amended Senate bill simply reduced the probability that a lower
federal court might do so by diluting the power of a single district
court judge to provide such potentially debilitating equitable relief.
The report concluded that the Committee did not have sufficient
information concerning congestion in the lower federal courts “to
provide in a single bill for the creation of such necessary additional
judges as conditions may warrant or authorize.”403 The Committee
also was of the view that “a blanket bill providing for a large
number of additional judges would present practical difficulties in
the matter of consideration and passage,” and that “dealing with
these matters in individual bills relating to the particular district or
circuit affected” was “the sounder and better practice.”404 The Com-
mittee therefore recommended that the Senate request that the
Attorney General, in collaboration with the Judicial Conference,
make a survey of the conditions in the various districts and circuits,
and report their recommendations for additional judgeships at the
next session of Congress.405
The Senate passed the amended bill on August 7,406 but the House
disagreed to the Senate amendments and asked for a confer-
ence.407 The Senate insisted on its amendments and agreed to a
400. S. REP. NO. 75-963, at 4; see also 81 CONG. REC. 8703 (1937) (statement of Rep.
Sumners).
401. 81 CONG. REC. 8514 (1937); see also id. at 8703 (statement of Rep. Sumners).
402. Id. at 8514. Pennsylvania Democrat J. Burrwood Daly had introduced a bill very
similar to section 3 in the House on July 8. H.R. 7773, 75th Cong., 81 CONG. REC. 6963 (1937).
403. S. REP. NO. 75-963, at 5.
404. Id.
405. See id.
406. 81 CONG. REC. 8514-15 (1937).
407. Id. at 8557.
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conference,408 and on August 10 the conference committee issued its
report.409 The Senate adopted the conference report without debate
on August 10,410 and the House followed suit the next day.411 The bill
was signed into law by Roosevelt on August 24,412 after the bruising
congressional session had ended. In its final form, the bill largely
resembled the Senate version. The Attorney General was authorized
to intervene and become a party, though the requirement that he
first show a legal interest on the part of the United States was
omitted.413 The Senate provision for direct appeal of adverse de-
cisions to the Supreme Court, however, was retained.414 And the
Senate provision requiring three-judge panels in injunction cases
was adopted with some minor modifications.415 This provision for
three-judge panels in cases seeking injunctive relief against the
execution of federal laws remained in place until it was repealed by
the 1976 amendments to the Code of Judicial Procedure416—
ironically, one might think, just as the universal injunction was
emerging as a phenomenon,417 and the stakes of a single judge
having power to grant injunctive relief accordingly were becoming
considerably elevated.
III. AFTERMATH
At the request of the editor of the New York Times, House
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sumners prepared an explanation
of the bill that Congress had just passed for the paper’s August 15
edition.418 In the course of his exposition, Sumners remarked that
the measure “recognizes that to give to a single judge the power to
tie up the functioning of a national law or the exercise of a national
408. Id. at 8527.
409. H.R. REP. NO. 75-1490, 81 CONG. REC. 8701 (1937).
410. 81 CONG. REC. 8580, 8610 (1937).
411. Id. at 8705.
412. See id. at 9679; see also Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, 50 Stat. 751.
413. H.R. REP. NO. 75-1490, at 5.
414. Id. at 5-6.
415. Id. at 6.
416. See Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119. For an explanation of the
rationale for the repeal, see S. REP. NO. 94-204, at 1-4 (1975).
417. See Bray, supra note 48, at 437-45.
418. 81 CONG. REC. APP., at 2116 (1937).
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power is a disproportionate thing to do.”419 In contemporaneous
remarks, Illinois Republican Representative Chauncey W. Reed
proclaimed that Congress had given the country “Judicial Reform,
Not Chaos.”420 Under the Sumners judicial retirement bill, which
President Roosevelt signed into law on March 1,421 “aged Justices of
the Supreme Court may now retire from active service on the bench
without the apprehension that the emoluments of their office may
some day be discontinued or diminished.”422 The Chandler bill,
which was passed by the House on August 10,423 and would become
law in the following year,424 would provide “a new, concise, and
comprehensive bankruptcy act.”425 And H.R. 2260 permitted the
federal government to intervene in cases in which the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute was challenged, and authorized direct
appeal to the Supreme Court in the event of a decision holding the
challenged statute invalid, “with the assurance that it will take
precedence in that tribunal over all other matters not of a like
character.”426
Reed observed that it was
significant that these major reforms affecting the judiciary and
judicial procedure originated in the House of Representatives
many weeks prior to the President’s message of February 5, and
that they were already on the road to legislative enactment on
the day that the Nation was stunned by the pronouncement
from the White House that the entire judicial branch of our
Government must be made over by the wholesale appointment
by him of new judges to replace those who had reached their
seventieth birthday. It [was] also significant that the mandate
of the President for the immediate enactment of his bill in no
way arrested or delayed the careful and deliberate consideration
of these constructive measures. While the Senate proceeded to
consider the essence of the President’s message, the House of
Representatives went forward with its program of real judicial
419. Id.
420. Id. at 2135.
421. See Act of Mar. 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24.
422. 81 CONG. REC. APP., at 2135 (1937).
423. 81 CONG. REC. 8649 (1937).
424. See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
425. 81 CONG. REC. APP., at 2135 (1937).
426. Id.
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reform, and [enacted legislation that would] advance the efficacy
of our judicial system.427
With the Court-packing controversy settled, the 75th Congress
resumed the piecemeal expansion of the lower federal courts. In
1938, Congress created five new circuit court judgeships, and made
a temporary judgeship permanent.428 Two years later, Congress
created one new judgeship for the Sixth Circuit and two new
judgeships for the Eighth Circuit.429 At the district court level, in
1938, Congress added twelve permanent judgeships, and made
another temporary judgeship permanent.430 That same year, Con-
gress also created three new temporary district court judgeships,431
two of which were made permanent in 1940,432 and the other in
1941.433 In 1940, Congress also established one permanent and
seven temporary district court judgeships.434 In sum, in 1938 alone,
Congress created nineteen new permanent lower court judgeships.435
In the two years of 1938 and 1940, Congress created twenty-five
lower court judgeships; and between 1938 and 1941, Congress
created twenty-six436—not quite the forty-four that Roosevelt had
requested in his Court-packing bill, but many more than the mere
three that Congress granted him in 1937.437 During Roosevelt’s
tenure, the number of Article III judges grew from 211 to 262.438 By
427. Id.
428. See Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 290, 52 Stat. 584.
429. See Act of May 24, 1940, ch. 209, 54 Stat. 219.
430. See Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 290, 52 Stat. 584.
431. Id.
432. See Act of Nov. 27, 1940, ch. 920, 54 Stat. 1216; Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 282, 54 Stat.
253.
433. See Act of Nov. 21, 1941, ch. 479, 55 Stat. 773.
434. See Act of May 24, 1940, ch. 209, 54 Stat. 219.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 428, 430.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 428-34.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 257-58.
438. Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Administrative
Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 694 n.162 (2010). These figures actually understate the
growth of the Article III judiciary during Roosevelt’s tenure, as many of the judgeships
existing when Roosevelt took office were temporary offices that would cease to exist upon the
death or resignation of the incumbent judge. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. 837-38
(establishing twenty-three temporary district court judgeships). Congress made fourteen of
these judgeships permanent in 1935, Act of Aug. 19, 1935, ch. 558, 49 Stat. 659, and one more
permanent in 1938, Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 290, 52 Stat. 584.
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the time of his death in 1945, in addition to appointing nine Justices
to the Supreme Court, Roosevelt had appointed fifty-two circuit
court judges and 136 district court judges,439 remaking the face of
the lower federal courts for a generation. Rather than accelerating
this process, Roosevelt’s Court-packing proposal appears to have
impeded it.440
On the morning of February 5, 1937, Tommy Corcoran made a
surprising and not altogether welcome appearance in the robing
room at the Supreme Court.441 His purpose was to warn Justice
Brandeis of Roosevelt’s Court-packing proposal before it became
public knowledge.442 Corcoran handed a copy of the press release
outlining the President’s plan to the Justice, who, after reading it,
remarked, “[T]ell your president ... he has made a great mistake. All
he had to do was wait a little while. I’m sorry for him.”443 Brandeis
presumably was referring to the situation on the Supreme Court.
But his response applied as well to the state of the lower federal
courts. With respect to each, as Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Henry Fountain Ashurst had counseled Roosevelt not
long before the President announced his plan, “Father Time, with
his scythe, is on your side.”444
CONCLUSION
Narrative accounts of the Court-packing crisis often conclude with
a whimper, noting briefly that Congress enacted some lower court
reforms—typically unspecified—as a paltry sort of consolation prize
for the President, a weak balm to the open wound of political
humiliation. Authors have characterized the bill finally enacted by
Congress as an “emasculated version” of the Court-packing bill
“leaving only some minor provisions about reforming the lower
federal courts,”445 as “a hodgepodge of procedural changes that went
439. Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/apptsbypres.pdf [https://perma.cc/L26E-CT4W].
440. See supra Part II.B.
441. See SHESOL, supra note 1, at 296-97.
442. Id. at 297.
443. Id.
444. BAKER, supra note 1, at 8; SHESOL, supra note 1, at 206.
445. BAKER, supra note 1, at 267 (offering no description of the bill’s provisions).
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largely unnoticed,”446 and as a “face-saving expedient[ ].”447 As
Homer Cummings lamented to Roosevelt, the final bill was a
“meager performance.”448 Yet the lower court reforms enacted by
Congress in 1937 responded to a widespread, bipartisan perception
of a significant problem in the administration of justice, were intro-
duced before and seriously considered during the entire time that
the Court-packing plan was pending, and, because these reforms
were actually enacted and in force for nearly four decades, they
almost certainly had a greater influence on the course of American
legal development than did the President’s failed attempt to expand
the nation’s highest tribunal.
446. MCKENNA, supra note 1, at 521.
447. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 1, at 281-82 (offering no description of the bill’s
provisions).
448. SHOGAN, supra note 1, at 219; see also id. at 497 (referring only briefly to the
substitute bill’s “lower court reforms”); SOLOMON, supra note 1, at 251 (simply reproducing
the incomplete description of the agreement concerning the contents of the final bill provided
by Senator O’Mahoney’s meeting notes); William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan:
A Second Life, A Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 689 (making no mention of the lower
court reforms of the substitute or final bills).
